

MAN'S  
SOCIAL  
DESTINY

BY CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

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# MAN'S SOCIAL DESTINY

IN THE LIGHT OF SCIENCE

BY

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"CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE," ETC.



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## THE COLE LECTURES

THE late Col. E. W. Cole, of Nashville, Tenn., donated to Vanderbilt University the sum of five thousand dollars, afterwards increased by Mrs. E. W. Cole to ten thousand, the design and conditions of which gift are stated as follows:

"The object of this fund is to establish a foundation for a perpetual lectureship in connection with the School of Religion of the university, to be restricted in its scope to a defense and advocacy of the Christian religion. The lectures shall be delivered at such intervals, from time to time, as shall be deemed best by the Board of Trust; and the particular theme and lecturer will be determined by the theological faculty. Said lecture shall always be reduced to writing in full, and the manuscript of the same shall be the property of the university, to be published or disposed of by the Board of Trust at its discretion, the net proceeds arising therefrom to be added to the foundation fund, or otherwise used for the benefit of the School of Religion."

## THE COLE LECTURES

<i>Man's Social Destiny—In the Light of Science</i>	1929
By Charles A. Ellwood, Ph.D., LL.D.	
<i>Christianity and Success</i>	1928
By Bishop Edwin Holt Hughes.	
<i>Present-Day Dilemmas in Religion</i>	1927
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<i>The Religion of the Incarnation</i>	1903
By Bishop Eugene Russell Hendrix.	

## PREFACE

IN the spring of 1927 the Faculty of the Vanderbilt University School of Religion elected Dr. Charles A. Ellwood as the Cole Lecturer for 1929. It was the judgment of the Faculty that the present trend in our social, scientific, and religious affairs called for a further utterance from the prophetic voice that spoke so effectively in "The Reconstruction of Religion." After careful consideration of several subjects for discussion in harmony with the purpose of the Cole Foundation, Dr. Ellwood, with the prompt approval of the Faculty, chose to study the problem of human progress under the theme, "Man's Social Destiny."

It was especially fortunate that Dr. Ellwood was privileged to spend the academic year of 1927-28 in Europe and thus was enabled to enrich his lectures with material gathered in direct observation of conditions among our neighbors across the sea. As a result the Cole Lectures for 1929 provide a constructive and critical study of the major values and prospective permanence of our present-day civilization. The lectures show especially the next steps that must be taken by our social, scientific, and religious leaders if they are to further the progress of humanity toward its God-given goal.



Dr. Ellwood insists that a worthy social science will not only have an adequate method and program of research, but as well a passion for the service and saving of mankind. As to physical science, he indicates that if it is to prove a blessing and not a curse, it will be not merely concerned with the quantity of material assets which it places in man's hands, but equally concerned with the moral quality in men which makes them safe trustees of extraordinary power. "Our civilization is imperiled to-day simply because it is ill-balanced. Our spiritual culture lags so far behind our material culture in its development that we have no adequate control over the latter." Here we have the mutual task of science and religion. Dr. Ellwood's estimate of the task of the Christian Church is clear and impressive. "The building of a Christian civilization will be, equally with the saving of individual souls, the concern of the Church."

It will be seen from these suggestions that Dr. Ellwood's lectures make a volume which radiates a much-needed Christian optimism—an optimism tested in the fires of sincere scientific criticism and justified in the light of life's best-accredited realities. We publish these lectures with great confidence in their exceptional timeliness and abiding value.

O. E. BROWN,

*Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Religion.*

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## CHAPTER I

### PRESENT SOCIAL PESSIMISM





## CHAPTER I

### PRESENT SOCIAL PESSIMISM

WE are often told that it is more profitable to describe present conditions than to speculate about the future. The fashion in the scientific world just at present is to decry any attempt to predict the future. Let us remember, however, that the greatest masters of science have pointed out repeatedly that the whole structure of scientific knowledge is based upon the aphorism, "See in order to foresee," and that a science becomes exact in proportion as it is able to predict.

Perhaps it is this feeling which has led a number of popular writers recently to attempt to weigh the social tendencies of the present and to sketch the probabilities of the immediate future.<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly the stronger motive in these attempts to peer into the social future of mankind, however, is to be found in the perplexities and pessimism of the present and in the felt need of restoring faith in the possibilities of life. This was once, let us note, one of the functions of religion; but now science, in its more humanistic aspects, seems about to undertake to perform the same function.

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, "Whither Mankind," edited by Charles A. Beard. 1928.

In these lectures we shall not be concerned with the immediate social future, but rather with the remoter social destiny of man which seems to be indicated by our scientific knowledge of human nature and human history. Is man's social destiny thus indicated in harmony with the vision of idealistic religion, and especially with that of the Christian religion? Is the Christian utopia of a peaceful world ruled by active social good will and by loyalty to the highest ethical principles as divine commands a reasonable human possibility? Or are scientific facts and the principles of social development such as to render the realization of such a goal improbable and unreasonable? Are the ascertained facts of human nature and of human society opposed to this dream of the ages and such as to indicate that we should reconcile ourselves to a very different social development?

Obviously the whole future of Christianity as a social program and the whole future of our civilization depend upon our answer to these questions. Even the religious and ethical life of the individual depends upon our answer to these questions; for, as has often been said, it is not so much the pain and suffering of life which crushes the individual as it is its meaninglessness and hopelessness. But the very form of our questions implies that we must seek their answer in the actual trends of our human world, and not in speculations about God and the

universe. Especially must we face without flinching the facts of our present social world and see whether current social pessimism is justified. Let us present this social pessimism, examine the facts, and then see if our knowledge of human history and human society helps us to see our way through the tangled affairs of our world to the probability of a better and happier future.

"I believe thoroughly in only one thing," said a friend to me in Vienna last spring, "and that is, in the wickedness of men." He might just as well have been a friend in London, New York, or Chicago as in Vienna. He merely expressed the disillusionment which is common everywhere in our civilization since the Great War. Our faith in humanity, whether we were on the victorious or the defeated side, has been rudely shocked. We no longer talk much about "The Unfinished Program of Democracy" or "The Christian Reconstruction of Modern Life," because we recognize that faith in democracy and in Christianity as a social program has been so undermined that we must first of all restore faith in democracy and Christianity before we can talk intelligently of carrying through their programs. We must face without flinching this disillusionment in the ideas of democracy and Christianity which is now so widespread in Western civilization, and the resulting social pessimism and cynicism, because they are significant social facts,

even though they may prove to be but temporary. Just as we foolishly thought before the Great War that the evolutionary view of the world was firmly established, so too we foolishly thought that the democratic and Christian ideals of life were established *as ideals* in our civilization. But all these have now been rudely challenged; and we now see that the battle is not won, but must be fought all over again.

First, we must see what the social and moral condition of Europe is, because as Europe goes, so will probably go Western civilization; and as Western civilization goes, so will probably go our human world for some time to come. I want to quote to you, therefore, one or two of the more pessimistic of recent European writers, in order that you may ask yourselves how far the statements which they make are also true of certain sections of American society. Strangely enough, these pessimistic writers are peculiarly abundant in France, the land of victory. France, and especially Paris, epitomizes modern civilization, and the French of to-day, even as the French of the eighteenth century, have a keen eye as to their own defects.

In a work on "The Morals of the Age,"<sup>2</sup> M. Paul Gaultier, secretary of the Union Française and a leading publicist of France, calls attention to the

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<sup>2</sup>Published by Perrin & Company, Paris. 1928.

moral disintegration brought about by the war and the return of European peoples to the moral standards of paganism. With the utmost pessimism he says of present moral conditions, "Morality is dying, is dead, or nearly so, at least in the big cities, one may say, if one takes into account only appearances, or more exactly the spectacle, which the privileged classes afford." "For a long time morality has been undergoing a crisis which the war has aggravated to disquieting proportions." But it is not France alone which is suffering, but every country. "One of the distinctive traits of modern society in every country," M. Gaultier tells us, "is the sinking of the moral ideal in the minds and life of the people." "All ages," he acknowledges, "have been more or less corrupt even while knowing that they were so. The peculiarity of our age," he tells us, "is that it is corrupt and does not know it." "Long before the war morality, duty, began to disappear from our serious preoccupations." But the war aggravated all this, because "the war was in every respect a vast school of demoralization. Every rule of morality, public and private, was openly infringed."

Another influence working in the same direction, M. Gaultier believes, is materialistic science. "Under the influence of a science as superficial as proud," he tells us, "old beliefs have been turned into ridicule, conscience is treated as a superstition, and



honesty as a prejudice." "Self-interest alone remains as a motive, and pleasure as the sole end of life." These tendencies, though sponsored by the elders, have particularly affected the young. For many of them "evil consists, not in infringing social laws, but in getting caught." "Vice and virtue are for them words without meaning. Morality, duty, figure in their eyes as so many prejudices out of fashion and vestiges of centuries gone by." "They are not immoral," he concludes, "since morality presupposes an ideal from which one swerves; they are a-moral." A-moralism, he thinks, is the end toward which the present crisis in morals tends and is the distinctive trait of modern societies. Even the family, he points out, in certain circumstances "has given way under the pretext of tolerance or tenderness to the cultivation of even the worst instincts." Consequently the crimes of the young multiply with disquieting rapidity.

The Churches, also, M. Gaultier declares, seem powerless, at least temporarily, in this crisis. They "dare no longer, for fear of frightening away their flocks, present moral obligation in all its rigor." The teachings of religion are modified and bent to meet the contemporary indifference to spiritual values. Religion is no longer presented as "a strait and narrow way." It has become a broad path. "The decline of religious beliefs, skepticism

in regard to everything which is not directly perceptible, the preponderance of hygiene, war—the apotheosis of physical force—have placed the body upon a pedestal to the detriment of everything spiritual and have transformed it into an idol.”

It is women, in particular, next to the young, Gaultier believes, who are affected by this decadence in our morals. Modern women have become emancipated, but have lost their interest in spiritual things and are devoted to sports, fashions, and the elegant life. They wish to be loved, but not to love, and selfishly avoid the responsibilities entailed by children and home. Like men, they have returned to practical paganism in the exaltation of the body and of a life of self-indulgence. “Consequently,” Gaultier says, “modesty has almost totally disappeared.” “Habituated to nudity through the exigencies of sport, the most virtuous women, the most carefully brought up young girls, do not hesitate to exhibit themselves upon the athletic tracks, or all day upon the seabeaches, clad in the most scanty tights,” and he adds that in France “no one is astonished to see upon the stage of our music halls women completely nude.”

M. Gaultier points out how the moral problems of our civilization are aggravated by the difficulties of living, the complexity of life, and the conflicts and confusion of the modern world. He does not make the mistake of presenting moral problems

apart from the concrete conditions of living, but on the contrary points out that the triumph of materialism among us is due to the fact that our age is an age of machines and of physical science, which temporarily, at least, have crowded into the background all spiritual values.

Whether we recognize this picture of contemporary society drawn by M. Gaultier as true or not, those of us who have been much about in the world, especially in the great centers of population, have to admit that he has drawn his picture from verifiable facts, facts which seem to some of us altogether too common. M. Gaultier of course also sees the brighter side, and predicts a renaissance of religious faith. Whether again his general picture of our civilization is true or not, the things which he pictures, we must admit, should be the concern of all practical-minded religious people.

Even more disturbing in a way is the picture which another French writer, M. Julien Benda, draws for us in a book entitled "The Treason of the Intellectuals";<sup>3</sup> for M. Benda pictures our civilization as betrayed by its natural leaders. Our clergy, our literary men, our professors, and our scientists, he tells us, have given themselves over to the political passions of the hour, and instead of seeking to moderate these with reason and charity,

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<sup>3</sup>Translation published by William Morrow & Company. 1928.

they have intensified and universalized them. Moreover, they have exalted war, sport, material success, and even cruelty, or they have retired to their studies and been indifferent to the problems of the hour and have thus deprived the world of their leadership at the very time when it was most sorely needed. Thus the intellectual classes of the modern world have doubly failed; either they have weakly sided with the selfish passions of their groups, or they have failed to assume the responsibility of leadership which naturally belongs to them. Some even "proclaim the high morality of egoism and denounce humanitarianism as moral decadence." Agreeing substantially with M. Gaultier, M. Benda concludes: "Europe of the Middle Ages did evil, but honored the good; while modern Europe, with its teachers who proclaim the beauty of brute instincts, does evil and honors evil."

In regard to the betrayal of the masses to political passions by their leaders, it is well known that in many circles of the modern world patriotism and religion have become nearly identified, greatly to the detriment of religion. This is perhaps especially true in France, where, as Sir Philip Gibbs, the English journalist, tells us, "the word 'France' means to the average Frenchman far more than God or Jesus Christ."<sup>4</sup> Christianity as a social program

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<sup>4</sup>Gibbs, "The Day After To-Morrow," p. 213.

has little chance under such circumstances. We may note that the worship of the state began with the Romans. Every Roman citizen was expected to worship the power and authority of the Roman state, and this was the peculiar paganism against which early Christianity had especially to contend. The Roman Empire has disappeared chronologically, but its psychology still dominates Europe. Instead of one Roman Empire we now have a half-dozen or more, each aiming at world dominion and each setting itself up as the supreme object of the affection, loyalty, and reverence of its citizens. The foolish pride, the unreasoning fear, and the exaggerated self-interest which characterized pagan Rome still dominate most of the nations of the continent of Europe. Probably it is in the light of this fact that we must interpret the remark of a liberal religious leader in Italy to me last winter. He said, "Italy was pagan, Italy has been pagan, Italy is pagan"; and after a moment's thought he added, "The present rulers of Italy are not influenced by Christian ideals to any appreciable extent." He might, of course, have made the same remark of other countries and, indeed, of the whole world; but he was generous enough to apply it only to his own country. His last remark showed that he was thinking not so much of the private religious life of the people as of the lack of any social ex-



pression of Christianity in their civic life and relations.

Similar expressions are not wanting among English writers. A former teacher of mine, now a professor in Oxford University, Prof. F. C. S. Schiller, one of the best critical minds of our age, has said: "Humanity is still Yahoo-manity. Alike in mentality and morality, man is still substantially identical with his paleolithic ancestors. He is still the irrational, emotional, foolish, destructive, credulous creature he always was."<sup>5</sup> Another Oxford professor, a physical scientist, after emphasizing that the present age is an age of great mechanical power and of low morals, says: "Human ideals have not progressed to keep pace with the growth of science. They are ideals that cannot exist *with science* without wrecking the world."<sup>6</sup>

Europe, at least, has cause to be alarmed over its spiritual condition, but it seems at a loss to find a remedy. Meanwhile, Italy has abolished all freedom of thought within its borders, while Russia officially sanctions irreligion and approves a system of sex relations lower than any sanctioned by the lowest African tribe.<sup>7</sup> The paleolithic savages, so far as we know, had no such practices. Yet Europe

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<sup>5</sup>Quoted by Gibbs, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44. Italics mine.

<sup>7</sup>See the account by a friendly critic, Theodore Dreiser, in *Current History* for January, 1929, pp. 535-543.

remains unwilling to examine its ideals in the light of social facts; and to confirm M. Benda's charge, that it has been betrayed by its intellectual classes, one has only to note how a plenty of intellectuals can be found to affirm that Italy is all right, or that Russia is all right, or that France is all right, or that Germany is all right; just as we have in this country those who affirm that the United States is all right. It seems impossible at the present moment for the thinkers of the world to divorce themselves from partisanship.

Even Professor Whitehead, who can scarcely be counted as a pessimistic thinker, in speaking of the religious and ethical condition of Europe, remarks that "on the whole, during many generations, there has been a gradual decay of religious influence in European civilization. Each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor, and each period of slackness a lower depth. The average curve marks a steady fall in religious tone. Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable life."<sup>8</sup>

We, of course, cannot separate the destiny of our United States from the destiny of the rest of the world, and especially not from that of Europe. Still, it is of interest to raise the question how far these statements of European thinkers apply to

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<sup>8</sup>"Science and the Modern World," p. 269.

American conditions. Are we better than the rest of the world? We like to think so; but the kindest of our European critics tell us that we are dominated by materialistic aims in practically every phase of our life.<sup>9</sup> We may be a little freer from certain traditions than some European peoples. But how have we used our freedom? Are we using it to build up a more humane and Christian civilization, or are we still pursuing the pagan models which have come to us from old Europe?

There is, of course, no doubt that, just like Western civilization generally, we are badly divided between conflicting ideals of life. Prof. John Dewey, our most critical philosophical thinker, has recently said: "If ever there was a house of civilization divided within itself and against itself, it is our own to-day. . . . If one looks at the outer phenomena, the externally organized side of our life, my own feeling about it would be one of discouragement. We seem to find everywhere a hardness, a tightness, a clamping down of the lid, a regimentation and standardization, a devotion to efficiency and prosperity of a mechanical and quantitative sort."<sup>10</sup>

A leading American magazine<sup>11</sup> has said that the

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<sup>9</sup>According to Professor Siegfried, we are "a materialistic society, organized to produce things rather than people, without as a god."

<sup>10</sup>"Recent Gains in American Civilization," p. 257.

<sup>11</sup>The *Century Magazine*, August, 1928.

four things which the American people worship to-day are: physical strength, personal beauty, intellectual power, and financial success. One must remark of course that these things, if they are the highest values of the American people, are pagan and not Christian. The citizen of pagan Rome would probably also have held that these are the supreme values of life.

Another American magazine, substantially confirming the view just cited, has said of the young men on the make at present in our colleges and universities that they "develop a point of view which is wholly materialistic. They become overanxious for money. They are transformed, long before they are graduated, into the very type of citizen America now has to excess. They are selfish, hard, and ambitious. Such principles as dignity and honor soon fade to secondary importance."<sup>12</sup> Perhaps nearly the same might have been said with equal justice of the young women on the make in our colleges. At least another contributor to this same magazine, a prominent journalist, has gone so far as to say in effect of American women that they break all statutes from those requiring standing in line at registration to the law against murder—and with a clear conscience because to them every problem of conduct is fundamentally personal.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>*Harper's Magazine*, January, 1929, p. 156.

<sup>13</sup>*Harper's Magazine*, February, 1929, pp. 312-319.

Another contributor to the same magazine, a prominent business woman, says that "women have not as yet laid a feather's weight of distinctive influence (for good) upon the business world except in its most superficial aspects."<sup>14</sup> She denies that the women who have entered business have in any vital way altered or bettered the business world. Another woman contributor, speaking of the widespread cult of youth and beauty among American women, says: "The beauty of the body is getting to be too important. It wants to be a religion, and it belongs on the dressing table and not on the altar. It is a very false god, indeed, and it keeps thousands of its worshipers in terror, as false gods are apt to do."<sup>15</sup>

There is much in American literature and life which seems to show that the popular periodicals just cited nearly hit the mark. The literature of disillusionment and pessimism is as abundant in America as in Europe. It will be impossible, however, to do more than to select three or four books as outstanding examples of this trend in our culture.

The first book which I shall mention is a satire on some of the more intimate phases of our social life, but strangely enough it is usually taken only as a work of humor. The young people with whom it is popular quite generally fail to see that it has

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<sup>14</sup>*Harper's Magazine*, December, 1928, p. 16.

<sup>15</sup>*Harper's Magazine*, October, 1928, p. 562.

any serious implications. The book is Miss Anita Loos's "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes." It pictures the flapper of the period as a criminaloid, as belonging to "the powers that prey," and practically all men as fools. The book is one of the bitterest satires of contemporary social life, and its pessimism is relieved only by the humorous vein in which it is written.

Even more symptomatic of the trend of American social life are the works of Prof. John Erskine, especially his "Private Life of Helen of Troy" and "Galahad." Both books preach and teach immorality with a seductiveness which would make Nietzsche envious. They are read by people for their piquant style and for their humor. They are particularly popular among college students, among whom I have found them to be a source of extreme demoralization. Yet most of those who read them do not seem to appreciate that they are a subtle attack upon Christian moral standards; for young people of the present often do not seem to have any clear idea of Christian moral standards. Erskine's "Galahad" openly ridicules all Christian standards, and even ordinary pagan ones, proclaims that we do not know the difference between right and wrong, and that morality is simply our effort to put over our wishes on other people. Moral skepticism is the predominant note of the book. The deep cynicism and pessimism that is implied in all this we



need hardly enlarge upon. It is nothing less than a plea, like Rousseau's, to return to original nature. Only Rousseau's conception of nature was moral as compared with Erskine's. If this is "the new freedom," then we must agree with Prof. C. E. Ayres that "it is the dissolution of civilization—the whole of it and the only one we have."

Ayres's own book, "Science the False Messiah," however, is far more radical in its pessimism, because it attacks the very foundations of knowledge, and so of all culture. Erskine is content to direct his contemptuous skepticism against Christian moral standards; but Ayres directs his against the whole body of scientific tradition. Curiously enough, for this reason many religious people have hailed the book as an aid to religious faith. But religious faith will hardly profit in the long run through undermining our faith in tested knowledge. As a matter of fact, radical skepticism regarding everything human is the dominant note of Ayres's book. So far as it is merely an attack upon scientific dogmatism to show that it is no better than religious dogmatism we must all sympathize with the aim of the author. But there is nothing constructive in the book. All the traditions of civilization—religion, government, and morals not less than science—are treated as so much "Folklore."<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>*Op. cit.*, Chapter I.

The center of the attack, however, is upon modern science, which is represented for the most part as merely modern folklore. Trustworthy scientific knowledge is possible only where we can employ instruments of precision, and this is possible only in the mechanical realm. Science, he tells us, "begins in machinery and ends in machinery."<sup>17</sup> But the mechanical is not the whole of reality. Particularly objectionable to Ayres is the idea of social science, though the very vocabulary of the book is borrowed from Sumner's "Folkways." Most modern science is, therefore, of the character of folklore. It is unverifiable, because we have no instruments of precision to test it. "Folklore becomes holy," the author tells us, "by the same process by which the *mores* become holy: because the folklore make it so."<sup>18</sup>

The book as a whole is the deepest expression of disillusionment which our post-war period has produced, because it attacks faith in our own intelligence, not superficially, but radically. Apparently Dr. Ayres has not even the faith of my Viennese friend who said that he believed thoroughly in the wickedness of men, because that is a very considerable faith; but Ayres's faith is apparently only in the absolute foolishness of men, and that is a more radical form of disbelief; one which has been common, to be sure, since the age of Hume, but which has

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<sup>17</sup>"Science the False Messiah," p. 54.    <sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 30.

never, so far as I know, been expressed in quite the form which Ayres has given it. Hume's radical skepticism has at length been popularized by one who has the pen and the wit of a brilliant modern journalist. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has said, "This skepticism is a canker at the heart of science, affecting, as yet, only a few leaders, but capable, in time, of paralyzing the activities of the whole army of scientific workers."<sup>19</sup> It is therefore something to be reckoned with in any attempt to prognosticate the future expansion and influence of science.

Much more moderate in their pessimism are two other American thinkers, with whom I find myself nearly in agreement. One is Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, whose book, "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," is a challenge to those working in the religious field as well as those in the social sciences. "In spite of his new weapons and of his increased powers," says Dr. Fosdick, "man himself remains as he was and always has been—irrational, impulsive, emotional, inherently conservative to change, bound by customs and traditions which he will not analyze, the victim of age-old conventions and prejudices. Except for a certain urbanity, the good temper of the herd, modern man is probably not far removed from his paleolithic ancestors. Kept normally in control by the pressure of social in-

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<sup>19</sup>"Whither Mankind," p. 65.

stitutions, he is easily tempted to throw off the restraint, and all that is cruel or credulous or destructive in his inheritance wells up like a fountain of wine to intoxicate him. Science has exposed the paleolithic savage, masquerading in modern dress, to a sudden shift of environment which threatens to unbalance his brain. It has given him power and weapons which the utmost wisdom could scarcely be trusted to use aright.”<sup>20</sup>

Dr. Fosdick is, however, hopeful for the future if the social sciences can be properly developed, even though “the accepted conclusions of the social sciences are always made to run the gauntlet of tradition and prejudice.”

The other American thinker referred to is Prof. Harry F. Ward. He is frankly pessimistic about the trend of civilization in the United States. “In the past,” he says, “the term America stood for some other things besides machines and money-making. And it stood for those other things first, anywhere in the world. America was different from Europe in their minds as well as ours. And the difference was not the fusion of the conglomerate in the melting pot. For that was Europe, with its barriers down, modifying itself. America meant more than that, to itself as well as to the Old World. It meant freedom, and it meant equality. . . .

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<sup>20</sup>*Op. cit.*, pp. 36, 37.

How goes it then with freedom and equality in these United States at the present time?" Professor Ward points out that freedom and equality of opportunity tend to disappear in the United States. He says: "This is the test of whether or not a democratic civilization is developing. Does it spread its culture to the bottom of its population? . . . It cannot be denied that to an increasing section of the workers on the soil and in the city the door to the cultural life for their children is shut and barred." "If this is the permanent trend," says Professor Ward, "there can be no question but that it means decadence. If the children of those who once set up a new standard of freedom and equality, in terms of culture as well as politics, can be satisfied with the present equivalent of bread and circuses as a substitute for the control of their own development, it means that corruption has reached the heart of the democratic experiment and is not merely an excrescence on its skin."<sup>21</sup>

Even if these judgments of representative European and American thinkers are wrong, still there can be no question but that they must be taken into account in prognosticating the future of our civilization. It will be observed that these pessimistic utterances cover a wide range of social phenomena, from the moral condition of youth to

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<sup>21</sup>"Recent Gains in American Civilization," pp. 286, 288.

warlike attitudes and economic opportunities; but no one who understands human society can doubt that they are all closely linked together, and that together they form a very considerable indictment of our civilization. It will hardly be claimed by anyone who knows recent history that they are all post-war developments which we can expect will soon pass away. On the contrary, the tendencies mentioned have long been noted in the development of Western civilization, and nowhere more pronouncedly than in the United States. That the effect of the war was to aggravate these tendencies can scarcely be doubted. This was the universal testimony of every student of social conditions with whom I talked on the continent of Europe last year. Invariably these European students said to me: "Of course, you must not expect our condition to be better than it was thirty years ago. The war has aggravated practically all evils among us." Yet I must confess that personally I was disappointed to find this to be the case. It shows that the great battle for Christian, democratic civilization is still far from won, and as I said at the beginning of this lecture we are now beginning to perceive just what the real difficulties ahead of us are and their extent. After-the-war disillusionment has set the problem of our civilization in a clearer light than it ever has been before.

Perhaps this is well. Even if we see our difficul-



ties more clearly, we now know the enemy better, and we see what must be done. It is perhaps fortunate that the complacency and foolish optimism which characterized the nineteenth century, and even the twentieth century down to the World War, have disappeared. We can no longer base our hopes for the future of mankind upon the conditions of the present or upon the progress which we have recently made. Such a basis always has been unsafe; for as a rule individuals and nations are never so much in danger as when they rest content with the progress they have made and fancy themselves secure. Even if present conditions are not as bad as pictured by the writers whom I have cited, still it will not do to assume otherwise. If authorities can be cited on the other side, it must be said that we have scarcely touched the pessimistic literature of the present period of disillusionment. It would not be difficult to pile up many more pessimistic utterances even from our most distinguished thinkers. We can neither prove nor disprove that the world is headed right at the present moment. If we reach a qualified optimism as to the future of mankind, it must be based upon the nature of man, the nature of human society, and the nature of culture. Not by the achievements of the present, but by the long sweep of history, must we judge the probabilities of social evolution.

Moreover, no intelligent person would deny

that the international and the interracial situation are both still very clouded. In spite of our formal treaty renouncing war, competitive armament still continues among the nations. Suspicion, distrust, and misunderstanding still characterize interracial relations and may breed for us more trouble in the future even than our international rivalries and animosities. We must admit with Professor Santayana and with that prophetic churchman, Dr. J. N. Figgis, that possibly Western civilization is on its deathbed and is about to pass away to give place to another culture. Writing well before the World War, Dr. Figgis said: "We are in the midst of a process not unlike that of Western Europe in the fifth century when the world-organization was on its deathbed. The more I contemplate the face of things, the more does there come before me the vision of a whole order changing."<sup>22</sup> Even so, however, we shall see reasons for believing with Professor Santayana that the seeds of civilization would survive and blossom in another culture than our own.<sup>23</sup> Personally I do not believe that our civilization is on its deathbed, or has gone so far on the road to dissolution that it cannot come back. The most careful scientific study shows that there is no necessary decline and death of nations and civiliza-

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<sup>22</sup>Figgis, "Civilization at the Cross Roads," p. x.

<sup>23</sup>Santayana, "Character and Opinion in the United States," p. vi.

tions, Spengler to the contrary notwithstanding. Still the possibility of such a thing cannot be denied, and it is therefore well for us to see what forces of recovery reside in human society.

Prof. Gilbert Murray, whose view of history is remarkably clear and free from bias of any sort, has said: "A change which violates the consciences of men, a change which aims at less justice and more violence, at more cruelty and less freedom, has the probabilities heavily against its ultimate success." Why is this? Have we any ground for believing that reason and justice must ultimately win out among men? I mean, do we find good grounds for this faith in the historical social process? Or is it an arbitrary faith based upon some obsolescent religious dogma?

The course of history seems often to be, we must admit, the opposite of what Professor Murray has indicated. It would not be difficult to cite many examples from the world around us. There, for example, lies Blasco Ibañez, that doughty Spanish champion of democracy, dead in exile at Menton, while the dictator, Primo de Rivera, has apparently, temporarily at least, completely triumphed in Spain. Apparently all of Ibañez's work in building up his beloved Spain into a liberal democratic Christian state ended in defeat, and he died in exile and in disgrace. But there are still some of us who would rather be Blasco Ibañez dead than Primo de

Rivera alive and triumphant. For there are still some of us who believe that Blasco Ibañez in fighting for democracy and civic Christianity was fighting on the side which is bound to triumph in the long run; while Primo de Rivera, though apparently triumphant, is on the side which is bound to lose.

I need not remind you that this faith in the triumph of right in human society received its impetus very largely from the fact that nearly two thousand years ago a handful of men in Judea, when the whole world was still barbarous beyond our conception, dared to believe that a different sort of world was possible, one in which truth and love and justice should reign. Humanly speaking, there seemed no sort of chance that the ideals of these early Christians could possibly win out. When Jesus was put to death upon the cross, it must have seemed to all of his enemies and to most of his friends that his teachings, so subversive of the political and ecclesiastical order around him, were effectively crushed. Only a few of his disciples felt that it were better to die with him than to live with those who had put him to death. Yet for nineteen hundred years his has been the greatest influence working for the establishment of truth, justice, and love in human relations. Jesus was only a humble Galilean peasant whom the power of Rome could apparently easily crush; but all the power of

Rome and of the Jewish Church proved insufficient to crush his teachings, while the very memory of the Cæsars, the great ones of his day, is becoming obliterated from the minds of men.

While we must admit that Christ's ideals have not yet won out, still the world has been moving, even though with interruptions, toward these ideals. Something more than the arbitrary wishes of men must be involved in this movement. The Christian movement could not have had even the measure of success which it has met if it were not ultimately consistent with the nature of man, the nature of human society, and the nature of culture. So it is with every other movement which promises a successful issue in human history.

There are, we believe, scientific grounds for our faith in the possibility and probability of a better human world, in the realization of freedom, justice, and love in human relations. Just what these scientific grounds are we must attempt to see in the succeeding lectures.





## CHAPTER II

### THE RESOURCES OF MANKIND



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### THE RESOURCES OF MANKIND

ONE hundred and fifty years ago men still believed in the perfectibility of man. While there were those who disliked change, no one doubted the possibility of progress. Moreover, the method of progress seemed clear to the thinkers of the age. It consisted in the enlightenment of the human mind. Remove ignorance, prejudice, superstition, and the tyranny of Church and state, and men will spontaneously seek improvement. Break the shackles from the bodies and from the minds of men, and when they are free they will right themselves. This was the faith of the great leaders of eighteenth-century thought, Voltaire, Herder, Condorcet.

Condorcet, in his famous "Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind" (1795), said that the progress of society is "subject to the same general laws observable in the individual development of our faculties." He declared, moreover, "No bounds have been fixed to the improvement of human faculties." "The perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite," he said, "and has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us."<sup>1</sup> Let us stop here to note that these eighteenth-

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<sup>1</sup>*Op. cit.*, English translation, New York, 1796, pp. 10, 11.

century writers meant by the perfectibility of man especially the perfectibility of human society, though they included within the concept also the perfectibility of man as an individual.

Nearly a half century before Condorcet wrote his famous "Sketch," however, another great French thinker had set forth a view of human social development in which he attempted to show that progress, or social improvement, was inevitable in the historic process. This was attempted by Anne Robert Turgot in his celebrated "Second Sorbonne Discourse." History, Turgot said in effect, is a process of experience for mankind. But men learn from experience. Therefore history means the education of the race. Mankind learns from experiences, even from its mistakes and calamities, and so learns to perfect its institutions.

This is, of course, a very old doctrine, but in the form in which it was set forth by Turgot it was undoubtedly based upon the psychology of John Locke, who found in experience the sole source of human knowledge and of human self-development. Turgot found therefore that social progress was organic in human history. History was a process of human self-development. Turgot did not, of course, deny that there had been setbacks and even reversions in history. He did not advocate the idea of continuous progress in a straight line toward some definite goal. He admitted interruptions.

But he held that men would learn from these setbacks, would overcome obstacles and mistakes, and thus progress would be resumed. Thus in the long run mankind was bound to progress, and the idea of progress was the key to universal history.

Turgot, says Professor Bury, "regards all the race's actual experiences as the indispensable mechanism of progress and does not regret its mistakes and calamities. Many changes and revolutions, he observes, may seem to have had most mischievous effects; yet every change has brought some advantage, for it has been a new experience and therefore has been instructive. Man advances by committing errors. The history of science shows that truth is reached over the ruins of false hypotheses."<sup>2</sup>

Here is a breath of optimism coming to us from the eighteenth century which we sorely need at the present time. Whether we think Turgot was entirely correct or not, it must be admitted that groups of men do learn from experience, yes, even from their mistakes and calamities, if these are not such as to overwhelm them utterly. Whether they inevitably learn from experience or not is, of course, another question. It is a still bigger question how what is learned from experience may be consolidated and transmitted without loss from generation to generation. Before Turgot, Pascal had said, "All the

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<sup>2</sup>Bury, "The Idea of Progress," p. 156.

generations of men are like one man, ever living and ever learning." If this were only true, how easy would be the path of mankind upward to higher and better things! Unfortunately much of the wisdom that comes from experience is lost in the transmission from one generation to another; even within a given generation it often seems as though men cannot learn from experience. Some cynic has said, "Men's lives consist mostly in making the same mistake over and over again."

Much of the optimism of the eighteenth century and even of the nineteenth century was uncritical. There can be no doubt that it was carried to an extreme which we can no longer justify. We must admit, however, that the optimism of Turgot was grounded in a knowledge of human history and that it was not altogether uncritical. Other writers of the eighteenth century carried the doctrine of the perfectibility of man much further, and to unjustifiable extremes. Condorcet was the friend and biographer of Turgot, but, although a scientific man of great distinction, he lacked Turgot's balance. As we have already seen Condorcet believed that the progressive improvement of the human lot is limited only by the duration of the globe. The movement of humanity toward perfection may vary in velocity, but it will never be retrograde. If the progress of enlightenment continues, we may be sure of the continuous improvement of social conditions. "War,"



for example, he says, "will be made impossible through general enlightenment." Enlightenment will result in progress in the useful arts, which in turn will issue in prosperity and well-being, which again, Condorcet believed, "naturally dispose men to humanity, to benevolence, and to justice." Hence these virtues will become universal in human relations, and liberty, equality, and fraternity will become established among all men.

In the final chapter of his "Sketch" Condorcet ventures upon three great prophecies. The first of these is the destruction of inequality between nations as regards freedom and civilization. All nations are bound to become perfect in freedom, and being equally free, they will be recognized, whether big or little, as having equal rights. One uniform civilization will fill the world, and the distinction between advanced and backward peoples will disappear. All nations will be raised to the level of France and the United States. Condorcet prophesied, secondly, the destruction of inequality between classes, both as regards education and as regards wealth. Inequality between individuals is chiefly brought about by unequal opportunities for education. These opportunities will tend to be equalized for the different classes of society as enlightenment progresses. This will lead to equalization in regard to wealth; for when men are nearly equal in intelligence their ability to acquire wealth will be nearly

equal. Condorcet did not propose communism; but he believed that the equalization of education would work toward the equalization of wealth in society.

Finally, Condorcet prophesied the indefinite improvement of individuals, physically, mentally, and morally. Physically man will improve, he says in language which seems written but yesterday, because the science of medicine "must in the end put an end to transmissible or contagious diseases, as well as to those general maladies resulting from climate, food, and the nature of occupations."<sup>3</sup> Bodily defects and diseases of every sort will be eliminated by proper physical education and by medical science. Moreover, as Condorcet believed in the inheritance of acquired traits, he thought that each generation would be born with a little better physical equipment than the former one. Hence human life would be indefinitely prolonged, and man would enjoy a relative immortality here upon earth. In the same way the human individual would be perfected intellectually. Knowledge of every sort would accumulate and would be equally diffused. Equal opportunities for education and intellectual training would be open to all. Each generation again would be born with better mental endowment than the preceding, and so more intelligent. Finally, for the same reasons, man is bound to become perfected

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<sup>3</sup>*Op. cit.*, p. 290.

morally. Knowledge will show the advantage of virtue, and the practice of the virtues will lead to the moral improvement of mankind, first through diffusion, then through the inheritance of acquired characters.

Much ridicule has been poured upon Condorcet's optimism. But before we dismiss it as fantastic let us note that the things Condorcet prophesied are still among the dreams of mankind, and in part in the process of being realized. The World War was supposed to have been in part to protect the rights of small nations and to defend democracy against the assaults of autocracy. Then, again, what do our universal education and our social legislation mean if they are not to equalize classes as much as possible as regards education and wealth? Again, though we may dismiss as unscientific Condorcet's doctrine of the inheritance of acquired traits, the program of the applied sciences in medicine, in religion, in legislation, and in education is nothing less than the indefinite improvement of the individual, physically, intellectually, and morally.

Moreover, Condorcet was fully aware that the human mind generated errors and prejudices as well as truths. Errors and prejudices, he tells us, like truths, are "the consequence of the activity of the human mind." In general they are of three sorts: (1) The "prejudices of philosophers," which are impediments to the acquisition of new truths; (2)

the prejudices of the less enlightened classes, which retard the propagation of truths already known; (3) the prejudices of esteemed and powerful professions, which do both.<sup>4</sup> Condorcet, therefore, recognized that the establishment of intellectual freedom is necessary for the elimination of errors. But he believed that with the freeing of the mind it would in time recognize and correct its own errors; that it was just as possible to have sciences of human society, with prevision of the future, as it is to have physical sciences with such prevision; and that more and more mankind would be guided by such knowledge. This was Condorcet's faith, and it was not an unreasonable one, if taken in its broader aspects.

But it speedily degenerated. A great number of physical scientists began to predict that physical science in its various branches—physics, chemistry, biology, the medical sciences—would soon make a new earth in which man would control nature and live in a heaven of unlimited enjoyments. They failed to see that the bigger problem was the control of human nature and human relations. Consequently the social sciences received scant attention and were not developed, as Condorcet had urged that they should be. Moreover, the physical sciences tended to set up a false ideal as their utopia—namely, the physical enjoyment of nature. The physical

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<sup>4</sup>*Op. cit.*, pp. 19, 20.

sciences thus tended to mislead mankind. It is difficult to say, indeed, whether the development of the physical sciences at the expense of the social has been, on the whole, a benefit or a detriment to mankind. Certainly there have been ages with but little knowledge of the physical sciences happier than our age with its abundant knowledge. If it is true that our present civilization is built upon physical science and machinery, as Dr. C. A. Beard maintains,<sup>5</sup> then we may well fear that our civilization is built upon sand.

While physical science was proclaiming itself the savior of mankind, the theory of evolution, which was in the process of development, became a new basis for a still more foolish sort of scientific optimism. In some way or other, in the public mind, evolution became confused with progress. Nature was at work selecting the best from among her variants, and it was believed, in time, would produce the perfect. Thus progress was conceived of, not only as inevitable, but as automatic, going on independent of the human will. Even the existing strong and successful individuals, nations, and races were held by some to be manifestly those who were on the road to perfection. Evolution took the place of the Providence of theology in the minds of some. How unconscious, automatic selection could

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<sup>5</sup>"Whither Mankind," p. 14.

bring about all these beneficent results nobody could quite satisfactorily explain; but it is evident that in its more exaggerated forms this theory almost deified blind nature.

Of course, we must bring all this scientific optimism into contact with realities, as we find them in human history. "Indifference to history," Dr. Ayres tell us, "is the essence of optimism." History is the touchstone of social science, not because it proves anything one way or the other as to the future, but because it reveals the facts and forces which make or mar human civilization. The scientific interpretation of history, however, has not yet gone so far that we can feel sure that we fully understand all the forces which make or unmake a nation or a civilization. But it has gone far enough to show us that there is no necessary benevolence in natural, uncontrolled social or historical processes. Even Condorcet's optimism receives a rude blow when we contemplate the present condition of the world's oldest civilizations.

Let us cast a glance first at the civilizations of India and China. These civilizations vastly antedate our own. Yet their condition in recent times seems less happy than it was several centuries back. Poverty, ignorance, superstition, and exploitation still hold their masses in thrall. The social picture which they present is, on the whole, to our Western eyes, not a hopeful one. It may be said



that they are in their present condition because in their development they have lacked the leavening influence of Christianity and physical science. But why have they lacked them? Christianity was brought to both India and China many centuries ago. Why did they not receive Christianity? Was it beyond their intelligence? Then, too, was the development of physical science beyond the powers of the Indian and the Chinese mind? Obviously, it was not. Finally, we must frankly face the question whether Christianity, in its theological form, and physical science, if they had flourished in India and China, would have saved those civilizations from the social misery which so abounds in them.

To get some light on this question, let us take Italy, where European civilization has flourished longer and more uninterruptedly than in any other country. Italy did not suffer the catastrophes which overwhelmed Greece; even though the development of its civilization suffered a check through the fall of the Western Empire, yet for seventeen centuries—from the time of Julius Cæsar to that of Galileo—Italy was practically the undisputed leader of European civilization. In Italy European civilization has had a longer time to develop than in any other country, and its development has been accompanied by the development of theological and ecclesiastical Christianity, and, in recent centuries, by the development of physical science. Yet the

result of the development of civilization in Italy down to date has not been altogether satisfactory. Italy to-day is overpopulated relative to its resources, the mass of its people live in poverty and ignorance, superstition abounds, and the tendency to civic disorder has been so great that it has given excuse for the establishment of an autocratic form of government, the present Fascist *régime*. Italy, the eldest daughter of European civilization, in other words, does not seem to be developing toward freedom, democracy, and an adequate life for all. We may well raise the question whether the whole world is not evolving in the same direction as Italy. Possibly this eldest daughter of our civilization shows the way we are headed. Or, to put it still more bluntly, may not the world of the future, if we are not careful, see widespread among all peoples something resembling the present conditions of India and China and Italy instead of a utopia of enlightenment and democracy? This is not a comforting reflection; but we must face the facts, if there are facts, which might support such a conclusion.

In the first place, there are the biological facts. A certain school of biological thinkers are fond of assuring us that struggle is the law of life, that only temporary mitigations of this law are possible, because all forms of life, man included, tend to increase in greater numbers than food and resources warrant; that the result is renewal of struggle, ex-

ploitation, and social misery. All utopias, even the most relative, are bound to be shipwrecked upon this rock of increasing numbers and the lack of food and resources. This, they say, explains the social misery of the older civilized nations, such as India, China, and Italy.

Superficially this view seems plausible. If, however, we take Italy as an example to study, we soon find that Italy's dense population is not due to any biological law or to geographical location, but is wholly a result of her culture. We find that Italy's rulers from the days of the Cæsars until now have usually desired and encouraged a large population for military and commercial reasons. We find, moreover, that the Roman Catholic Church in Italy has encouraged large families and has generally frowned upon all interferences with nature in this respect. These two influences, together with the ignorance and poverty of the people of Italy, are sufficient to account for the relatively overpopulated condition of Italy, without invoking any biological law. Investigations of population in India or China would produce similar results. The growth of numbers in human society, in other words, is controlled not by any law of nature, but by conditions of culture.<sup>6</sup> If, however, culture can control

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<sup>6</sup>"Culture," as used in sociology and anthropology, includes all that enters into the civilization of a people in the broadest sense of that word—tools, customs, institutions, values, etc.

the growth of population, then we have no reason to draw the pessimistic conclusion that our human world is forever condemned to misery and internecine struggle because of the pressure of population against food supply and natural resources. If material culture makes possible the growth of numbers, then spiritual culture can limit their growth, as indeed it has done repeatedly in human history. As a matter of fact, material culture may do almost as much to lessen the pressure of population against resources as non-material culture. It does so, not only by increasing food, but also by affording opportunity for certain classes to raise their standard of living, which in turn acts as an automatic check upon their birth rate. We shall therefore be not far from correct if we conclude that population growth is wholly within the control of culture.

But there is another biological factor which some biological thinkers say is likely to wreck our hopes of a better human world. That is the factor of blood or heredity. General impairment of heredity, they say, may come through the intermixture of races—that is, the process of hybridization; or it may come through the reversal of selection in human society—that is, through the survival of the defective, the weak, and the incompetent. The racialists and the eugenists assert that these processes of racial deterioration are already proceeding

rapidly in many civilized nations. They would account in part for the social misery in the nations we have mentioned. Italy, for example, would not have nearly so much social misery if it had not so many biological inferiors in its population.

But let us examine this statement. I cannot go into a statistical refutation, which I believe would be possible if we had reliable statistics, but I would like to say that I have been through the worst slums of Italy, and so far as I could observe the children of those slums were born as normal as children anywhere, even though they had little chance to grow up normally. I have closely observed the younger population of Italy, and my impression is that they are about as good human stock as will be found in any country; and this is generally the impression of unprejudiced travelers. Finally, if we look into history we shall find that Italy lost its leadership of European civilization through unfortunate social and political institutions and events which interrupted learning and destroyed intellectual freedom. Great creative minds could not flourish in Italy after Galileo, because the social atmosphere was not favorable, and not because of any impairment of Italian blood. It is doubtful if heredity and eugenics have played, or can play, the part in human history which their advocates claim. Normal heredity is, of course, necessary for normal human life; but there is no evidence that any historic nation

has ever suffered any general impairment of its normal human heredity. Nature seems to have largely shielded the racial germ plasm even from the effects of alcoholism and venereal disease. Even if eugenic practices are desirable in every human group, which I would be among the first to proclaim, they are possible only through culture—that is, through generally accepted ideals and through some rational system of social control over sex relations. It is not so much the lack of eugenics which has produced social misery as it is social misery which prevents the dissemination of eugenic ideals and practices.

As to the intermixture of races, the pessimists say that this is now going on on a world-wide scale and that it is bound to result in filling the world with a mongrel or hybrid stock, which will have the good qualities of no race. They again point to Italy as a terrible example of the effects of race intermixture. It is true that there is no Italian race and that the present population of Italy is the result of the intermixture of many races. When Italy was Rome, all the world flocked to Italy, just as all the world is flocking to-day to the United States. The Roman system of slavery, moreover, brought slaves into Italy from practically every known people. After the fall of the Western Empire various barbarian stocks from the north settled in Italy, and during the Middle Ages still other peoples came. Italy,



by the way, did not prove to be wholly a melting pot. Still to-day northern Italy is inhabited mainly by Celtic and Teutonic elements, while in southern Italy the Mediterranean stock predominates, though there has been a great deal of intermixture everywhere.

In spite of this intermixture of races, or perhaps just because of it, no nation at the time of the Renaissance exhibited such surprising vitality and genius. Nor is it true that Italy's great men came from just one or two of her racial elements. Apparently Italian great men were derived in about equal proportions from all of Italy's racial stocks. Dante and Raphael seem to have been relatively pure Mediterraneans, while Michelangelo and Galileo seem to have come from the Celtic or possibly the Teutonic stock in Italy.

If we extend our investigation to other European nations, we get practically the same results. The populations of Great Britain and France, for example, are each made up of a half-dozen distinct racial elements. Anthropologists, indeed, tell us that there are now practically no racially pure populations in the whole world. All races are more or less mixed; and the mixed populations, such as those of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, are frequently among the most progressive. There is, therefore, no scientific basis for the belief that the intermixture of races will lead to cultural

stagnation and retrogression. On account of the difference of cultural levels of different racial groups, it may, of course, for the present be inexpedient and unwise to encourage racial intermixture. But to accept this as a fact is very different from finding in the racial intermixture which is going on in our world a basis for social pessimism as regards the future of mankind. So far as we know, all human races are capable of the same degree of civilization. All are capable, for example, of receiving and realizing our Christian ideals of life not less than of receiving and utilizing our physical science and machinery. It altogether depends upon how effective we can make the process of education.

Thus we find that the biological processes of life are not beyond human control and contain no element which is of necessity a bar to social progress. But we are told that there are certain factors in human nature which will prove such a bar. Whenever anything goes wrong in human society, certain pessimistic writers find the reason for it, not in the conditions of our culture, but in "human nature." It is a convenient scapegoat for all social evils. It is difficult to say exactly what these writers mean by "human nature." Presumably they mean the original endowment of man in the way of instinctive tendencies, feelings, and intelligence. Let us now examine these psychological factors as possible bars to progress.

The natural impulses of man, some of these writers say, will always keep man essentially a brute. Like other brutes, men desire simply to feed, to breed, to enjoy a comfortable shelter; and to keep these things they always did, and always will, fight for them. War, they say, is therefore natural to man. It is an instinctive tendency which will spoil the best-laid plans for a peaceful world. In the same way the sex impulse will be gratified at whatever cost and will spoil all the efforts of moral and religious reformers to create a society with stable monogamy and without sex vice or promiscuity. It does no good, they say, to try to repress these and other natural tendencies by various means of social control. They will break over all restraints at times, and the condition of society will be worse than before.

It may be pointed out in reply that man's natural impulses, or "human instincts," as they have unfortunately been called, have always been subject to control in all stages of culture. Indeed, the essence of culture or civilization, from one point of view, is just this control of natural impulses. All man's natural impulses without exception are found upon examination to be capable of modification or education. All human instincts, therefore, express themselves in accordance with the culture of the group. If war, sex promiscuity, gambling, and stealing abound in our world, it is because we have

traditions in our culture which favor such expressions of natural tendencies. Moreover, when restraints of natural tendencies are reasonable, we find no evidence which leads us to believe that they are injurious. Civilization is necessarily filled with restraints of every sort. Unless restraints are needless or arbitrary, we need hardly to fear their social effects. Man's instinctive tendencies are, therefore, not only controllable by culture, but may be controlled greatly to man's advantage.

But it is said that man's natural feelings or emotions will work against any such control for the good of the whole. Feeling is individual and is therefore selfish. We can only act selfishly, the cynics say, as it is impossible for any one to act except to increase his own pleasure. The best possible condition of human society, therefore, can only be a balance of individual and group egoisms, a balance which may at any moment be upset and thus precipitate strife. Just because our world is necessarily ruled by self-interest, they say, it is necessarily a world in which the brotherhood of man can never be anything more than a shallow pretense.

It is correct to say that there is little basis for such a view even in biological science. While it is true that feeling is individual, it is not true that all feeling is merely self-regarding. Our natural feelings, or emotions, are attached to our natural impulses, and some of these impulses have to do with the

safety and welfare of offspring and other members of our group. That is to say, some are other-regarding. Some unselfishness, in other words, is as natural to us as selfishness. If this is the way nature made us, then what we are in adult life, selfish or unselfish, quite entirely depends upon our bringing up, the feelings and impulses we have cultivated. Our individual culture determines our character in this regard, not any necessity of nature. If our world at the present time is one of rampant self-interest, as I fear we must say, it is because our culture is one which stimulates individual and group egoism, greed, fear, and pride. It is entirely conceivable that another sort of culture might stimulate equally altruism, sympathy, and mutual trust. Moreover, if we find pleasure in the welfare of others, then self-interest is not absolute and is not inconsistent with an altruistic society. By the cultivation of such feelings we may come in time to find our keenest pleasure in doing good. Therefore the feelings and emotions of man are entirely controllable by culture. They are quite as capable of socialization as any other element in human nature. Indeed, the essence of socialization consists in so modifying the feelings of the individual that they harmonize with the welfare of his group. They may be made, therefore, to harmonize with the welfare of the largest possible human group, humanity, if culture takes that direction. Sympathy is the

natural cement which binds human groups together, and sympathy is capable of cultivation. In the form of altruism, or regard for others, the growth of sympathy is one of the chief means of progress. This is true also of the so-called "nobler emotions." Human emotions, then, if culture stimulates the right ones, are no bar to social progress, but may greatly aid it.

We have finally a group of pessimistic writers who tell us that human intelligence is not equal to the task of managing and controlling the complex world of modern civilization. It is already failing, and it will fail even more as our world grows more and more complex. The natural intelligence of man is adapted, they say, to the wild life in the woods of our primitive ancestors. There is little probability that it can control successfully a machine civilization. These find support for their contention as to the natural limitations of the intelligence of the mass of mankind in the work of the intelligence testers. For example, they tell us that the intelligence quotient of the people of the United States is only equal to that of a child of thirteen years. This was demonstrated, they say, by the draft statistics of the United States Army, 1917-18, based upon the study of nearly a million white recruits. Now, what can be expected of a crowd of children thirteen years old? Can they be expected to govern themselves wisely, conduct great enterprises efficiently, or



even appreciate art or science? Manifestly the whole dream of an intelligent, law-abiding, self-governing society, in which justice shall be realized, if this is the average intelligence of the population, is an absurdity; and it becomes more and more an absurdity with every increase of the complexity of our civilization. Our world is getting too large, too complex, for the average intelligence. The only hope of order is through the dictatorial rule of the few qualified, such as is being tried in Italy.

In reply it may be said first of all that we may well doubt such statistics of intelligence testers, if they are meant to show the social intelligence of the masses. They do not show the limits of ability, and in the nature of things they cannot. While the capacity to learn is inborn in man, the actual intelligence of an individual at any given time is largely acquired. Intelligence is problem-solving ability, and it is increased in any given direction by training. How socially intelligent the mass of mankind can be made, we do not know, because we have never tried to train them far in that direction. Our statistics prove nothing in this matter. Moreover, we must remember that appreciation and performance are two very different things. Music illustrates this point. Probably ninety-five per cent of mankind can be taught through an appropriate culture to appreciate good music; but perhaps not more than five or ten per cent can be taught to per-

form well on any musical instrument. So it is with the problems of society. Possibly not more than five per cent of our population can be taught to solve the more complex social problems; but perhaps ninety-five per cent can be taught to appreciate a right solution.

But the main criticism of this theory, that mankind has not sufficient intelligence to build a much higher civilization than any yet achieved, is that it totally misrepresents the method of cultural advance. Only indirectly is civilization dependent upon individual intelligence. We are probably no more intelligent than the Greeks of the age of Pericles, but our culture is much more advanced both on the side of knowledge and of mechanical contrivances. Aristotle's mind was probably one of the best which our race has produced. But Aristotle would be astonished to-day, not simply at our machines, but even more at the extent of our knowledge. While culture is produced by the human mind, it is originated by the few and utilized by the many. Not many of us can produce an automobile, but ninety-five per cent of us can learn to use an automobile. The culture of a group, therefore, depends upon its leadership and upon the reaction of the group to leadership. This is not an argument for autocracy, as it is so often construed. The weakness of autocracy is its form of leadership. Instead of teaching the masses, it drives and coerces.

The masses therefore do not fully participate in the process of culture, but are left more or less in the status of children. A non-autocratic society, on the other hand, advances in culture only as the masses participate. It depends upon the development of personality in the masses, and this is its strength. Its leaders strive to lead through teaching rather than coercion. Such a society moves more slowly, but probably more surely.

The method of culture is, therefore, invention, appreciation, diffusion, and accumulation. It builds a medium in which the individual lives, moves, and has his being; but it depends only indirectly upon the intelligence of the individual, because the cultural process itself creates intelligence in the individual in specific directions. The rise of Christianity, of any institution, or even of any tool will illustrate this. The creation of Christianity was the work of a few transcendent minds, especially the mind of Jesus. It was taught to his disciples and then to the masses. Gradually they came to appreciate it. Peter, Paul, John, and others added to the teaching, and a host of agents diffused it to the European peoples. Thus gradually Christian institutions and a Christian culture were built up which created an ethical intelligence and a moral character in individuals. If this work is still far from satisfactory completion, it is only because there were antagonistic elements in European culture which

have, even to the present, opposed the acceptance of Christianity, or because the Christian movement became itself corrupted through the reaction of individuals and groups concerned with its transmission. Both things are true; and they illustrate the difficulties of diffusing a cultural pattern, especially in non-material culture, and preserving the original design. But the fact remains that the culture of a group is a psycho-social product, largely outside of the individual, which molds the individual's intelligence and character in conformity to its own pattern. As it proceeds by invention and accumulation, always building further upon the basis of past achievements, there are no limits to cultural development that are yet visible. It is particularly hazardous to find such limits in the intelligence of the masses, because it is the plain teaching of social science that culture transforms the individual; in other words, creates the individual that we know. So far as we know, there is no culture created by man to which human intelligence is not able to adapt itself.

Such a proposition is a contradiction in terms; for we must always remember that culture is the creation of the human mind; that it develops through a process of learning; and that this learning process transforms both the group and the individual. The human mind does doubtless limit the direction and ends of culture; but it is hardly pos-

sible that it cannot control what it has made, if it sets itself to the task of controlling. The only basis which we can find for such a fear is imagination. The fear has arisen, however, because we have neglected the task of controlling. It is a result of our present poorly balanced culture, overdeveloped on the materialistic side.

But the very method of cultural development gives us still another sort of social pessimism. If culture makes mankind what it is, how, it may be asked, can culture correct its own errors? Suppose culture gets started wrong. What will prevent it from keeping on in a wrong course? If errors and prejudices are products of the human mind, not less than truth, goodness, and beauty, then why may not errors and prejudices continue indefinitely? If the war system, for example, has been a part of European culture for the past ten thousand years, even granting that it is a social error, how is it to be gotten rid of? If culture molds the character of individuals, then we must expect that the character of European peoples will be warlike; and it is absurd to expect them to become peaceful when the war system remains a dominant part of their culture.

Here the real problem, the real difficulty, of man's social development is at length touched up. It is not the bogies of overpopulation or impaired heredity, nor even the social inadequacies of human instincts, emotions, or intelligence, which threaten

to put a bar to social progress in the future, but rather the errors, mistakes, prejudices, and stupidities which already exist in our culture. Errors may persist in culture for centuries probably without serious harm, but there always comes a time when the erroneous belief, the inadequate tool, or the out-of-date institution is a handicap. War, for example, has persisted for thousands of years without rendering our species extinct. Indeed, it taught mankind much, and for centuries favored the progress of civilization, because in its hard school peoples learned much. But it is now a disastrous maladjustment, because it represents a hold-over of the methods of barbarism when we have better ways of settling disputes between groups. Here, then, is a typical situation within culture. We have a long-established institution, or set of institutions, with a strong supporting social tradition; yet the institution is no longer adjusted to our general culture. How can it be changed?

Let us take another illustration. Ancestor worship was once a great forward step in religion, for it made religion the great conservator of traditional social values. Its essence was the veneration of the past. It taught men to look to the past for wisdom—that wisdom was to be found only in the past; and it used family affection and loyalty to reënforce this teaching. There can be no doubt about the social utility of such an attitude in certain stages of



social evolution. Yet ancestor worship is now a hold-over among many peoples, and particularly among the Chinese, where the ethical system of Confucianism is based upon it. Confucianism is a reactionary conservative influence which will for a long time prevent China, at least the Chinese masses, from becoming progressive. Yet how can it be replaced by a progressive religion and an idealistic ethics?

Some of the difficulties of rationally guiding and changing a culture or civilization should now be manifest. A civilization may get started in a wrong direction not simply through errors and misjudgments, but also through the fact that an institution or a custom which once worked well persists long beyond its usefulness, and even after it has become a positive detriment. Every civilization is filled with these "lags in culture," as they are called, especially on its spiritual or non-material side. The explanation is simple. Material culture changes more readily in a rational direction, because comparatively simple tests as to efficiency can usually be applied to its objects. Spiritual culture, on the other hand, is supported by a tradition taught the younger generation by the elder; and until recently the only test that could be applied to it was this traditional knowledge. Spiritual culture is, therefore, much more likely to be dominated by mere tradition than material culture. That is the reason

why our morals, our politics, and even our religion are frequently of the stone age, while we are living in a world of complex machines.

When we reflect that back of us but a few generations there existed a world of almost continuous warfare, of universal slavery, of class exploitation, of autocratic domination, and of brutal forms of self-indulgence, we can see, perhaps, how inevitable it is that many of these traditions should still be very strong in our society, and perhaps, also, how great the danger that we are in. It is not the defects of man's inborn nature which threaten us so much as it is these barbarous traditions in our culture. These are what still breed savages within the walls of our civilization. This is why we find the old savage still existing within our new civilization; and he will continue to exist until we can find some way of putting an end to these traditions of barbarism among us.

Undoubtedly the most dangerous of these traditions is that of settling disputes by fighting instead of by rational agreement. When this method is resorted to by individuals or small groups, we have crime, which practically all recognize as an evil; but when it is resorted to by large groups, we have war, civil or international, which many still fail to recognize as an evil. Yet both war and crime not only involve the nonproductive use of energy, but dissolve social bonds. Both are socially destructive.

The greatest danger which confronts our civilization is undoubtedly that our world may get involved in a series of inter-class, international, and interracial conflicts which may bring about a cultural decline. We know of no reversion in civilization within historic times which has not been brought about chiefly by prolonged civil and international war which interrupted learning and so stopped the transmission of culture.

But another danger confronts our civilization which might in the long run prove equally as destructive as a general war; and that is the ethics of self-indulgence. I pass over the danger from class exploitation and autocratic domination, because I take it that these on a large scale are likely to eventuate in civil war, and that their danger is therefore the danger of such conflict. But self-indulgence, or "luxury," as we call it, as a social phenomenon, is usually not recognized as a danger to society. Yet it is just as much a nonproductive use of energy as war, and is quite as liable to interfere with learning, especially with the learning of the higher forms of social discipline and self-control. It is almost the sole source of those corruptions of peace which are hardly less deadly than the brutalities of war. It is the main reason why victory is often more harmful to the victors than defeat is to the defeated. It destroys the morale of a people, because it undermines all social discipline. It is

apt to lead to class exploitation and so ultimately to civic disorder and to civil war. Rome would probably never have fallen a victim of foreign foes if it had not become a rotten shell from its own vices or barbarous forms of self-indulgence. May we not be going the way of Rome?

The dangerous situation in which our particular civilization finds itself at the present moment must now be manifest. Our material culture has advanced by leaps and bounds until we find almost unlimited physical power in our hands; but our spiritual culture has lagged, and we find many of the traditions of barbarism still strong among us, especially the traditions of war and self-indulgence at the expense of others. These traditions, along with the ignorance and paganism of the masses of mankind, make our world, we must acknowledge, a veritable powder house at the present time. Almost any powerful group foolish enough to do so could explode it. If Western civilization emerges from this situation safely, it will only be through a deeper appreciation of the social ethics of Jesus than it has yet shown. And our danger is increased rather than diminished by the fancied security in which our masses live.

So we come back to our question, How can a culture correct its own errors? If we acknowledge that the civilization of Europe and America (to be specific) has faults, and very grave ones, that it

has entered upon a wrong course, then how can it change its course? The reply is that it could not do so if culture were a closed circle. But culture is not a closed circle. It is modified by physical nature, on the one side, and by human nature on the other. The human individual is not only the bearer of culture, but is also the creator of culture. More strictly perhaps we should say that the individual reacts upon and modifies the culture he receives from his group. As a great anthropologist has put it, "The civilization stream is not merely carried, but is also unrelentingly fed by its component individuals." In other words, there is no absolute determinism of social behavior by culture. But it is the exceptional individuals who generally change the direction of a culture. It is the inventive mind. In the social realm it is some one like Christ, or Luther, or Lincoln, who can think ahead of his age. These minds perceive the pattern of the future. They do so because they are more sensitive than the ordinary man to the injustices, the maladjustments, and errors of the culture around them; and, if constructive, they set forth a new pattern, a new ideal.

Putting all this into other words, human intelligence is unrelentingly engaged in the making and the remaking of culture, and so of human social behavior. Culture has been made by man, and it can be remade by man. The mass of the people are the slaves of custom and convention. They stone

their prophets and ostracize their innovators. But man's creative intelligence, seeing maladjustments and possible betterments, is, when given a chance, unceasingly at work modifying the pattern of life and setting forth new ideals to be realized. This creativeness is the first and the greatest resource of mankind.

Whether physical nature is on the side of social progress or not has often been debated. Much can be said for the view that nature is neutral in man's struggle to attain to an adequate and satisfying life. If overpopulation stimulates invention, yet, as we have seen, it also threatens progress. If the biological constitution of man has greatly aided him, yet it also endangers him. If human nature has some instinctive tendencies favorable to social progress, yet it has others which distinctly are not. If some human emotions help us to live with our fellow human beings, others decidedly do not. Even if human intelligence is the source of useful inventions, it is also the source of harmful errors. But, after all is said, we must remember that, in any ultimate view, man and his culture are the creation of nature or of some spiritual principle immanent in nature. This is sound science and sound philosophy. Man could never have started upon his career of remaking nature and himself if he had not been equipped by nature to do so. He could never have progressed as far as he has if the balance of



natural forces had been unfavorable to him. Nature has given man the materials with which to build a new world and has equipped him even with the incentives and the intelligence to build it. Even the very obstacles which lie across his path, the deficiencies of nature and the defects of human nature, have proved to be but the needed stimuli to man's achievements. The crises of birth and death, of pain and suffering, have given rise to his inventions, both material and spiritual. If physical nature does not seem altogether favorable to man's happiness, it could hardly be better devised to secure man's education and development. When once we have gotten rid of the illusion that the end of man's life is happiness, we shall have little hesitancy in pronouncing nature friendly to human achievement. We have no reason to believe that nature will not continue to be friendly. Her materials and her resources will in all probability continue to be supplied to man in over-abundance. But what use will be made of these resources will, of course, depend upon the man himself. Nature does not, and cannot, protect man from his own foolishness and mistakes. If she did, her coöperation would be fatal to his development.

Moreover, even if the structure of our civilization has defects, which we have admitted, these defects, like the deficiencies of nature, when once perceived, are stimuli to further progress. The truth is that

our heritage of culture, like our physical heritage, furnishes the materials with which we must build. Our cultural traditions are as precious as the gifts of physical nature. If we discover that there are startling errors and imperfections in these cultural traditions, that is a source of encouragement to the scientific student of society, because such discovery is the indispensable first step in the removal of those errors and imperfections. Again, the truth is that never did man possess so many means of mending his ways, of correcting his own errors, of controlling nature and self, as at the present time. If the enemies of human welfare are now great, we must remember that they have always been great, and that the resources of mankind to combat these enemies have never before been so great as they now are. If we must believe at times in the wickedness and in the foolishness of men, we must also believe in the achievements of man and in the possibilities of life. We have permitted our spiritual culture to lag, and we seem sadly deficient in moral courage, in faith, and in vision; but spiritual culture, like material, is capable of cultivation and of diffusion. Not disillusionment, but awakening, should be the result of the crisis through which our civilization has just passed.

Let us now briefly sum up what we have learned about the spiritual resources of mankind. It is true, as Turgot said, that human history is a process

of experience, a process of learning. Men learn, too, from their mistakes and calamities, not less than from their successes. But just as the individual is often slow to learn even from the lessons of experience, so the great groups of men are even slower in learning these lessons; and errors are continually repeated in history. This is all the more true because the lessons of experience learned by one generation are with difficulty conveyed to the next generation. Hence human history is a succession of trials and errors. But this is the natural method of learning, and we have every reason to believe that mankind will slowly learn in this way if in no other.

But advanced civilizations are now trying to learn in another way. For some time they attempted to organize their knowledge of physical nature, to test it out deliberately by most careful methods, and then to systematize it, so that it can be easily diffused and transmitted. This is the scientific method, and its superiority needs no demonstration. It still involves trial and error; but error is systematically eliminated, and increasingly tested knowledge results.

To some extent mankind has used a similar method in conserving its experiences along social, political, moral, and religious lines. It has organized these into traditions and more or less systematically taught them to the young. But it is only recently that the perception has come to us that the

scientific method may also be applied to these branches of man's knowledge. That is, we now perceive that social, political, moral, and religious knowledge may not only be organized, but can be tested by various methods of experience, and so much better fitted for diffusion and transmission. The difficulty here, however, is not simply the difficulty of agreeing upon tests for these sorts of knowledge which will be generally recognized as valid, but there is the further difficulty of diffusion and application; for social, political, moral, and religious knowledge is worthless unless it is acted upon by the masses. It is evident that in the case of knowledge of physical nature a few experts can apply such knowledge and all the people can profit; but in the case of social, political, moral, and religious knowledge the people themselves must act upon it.

Two further problems are evidently involved: the securing of scientifically trained social, political, moral, and religious leaders who can lead the people rightly along these lines, and the raising of the general level of the culture of the masses, so that they can appreciate such leadership. Let us note here that such a spiritual leadership requires very different qualities of personality than leadership along material lines. The leader in a purely materialistic line needs to be little more than a cold calculator. But the successful spiritual leader,

whether in social, political, moral, or religious lines, must be an emotional as well as an intellectual. He must be an emotional because he manipulates human material and not the relatively inert substances of physical nature. His sympathies need to be as wide, therefore, as his knowledge and judgment are sound. But even such leadership will avail little if the general cultural level of the people has not been raised to the point where they can appreciate a scientifically trained leadership along non-material lines. As long as the present social, political, moral, and religious illiteracy persists in our world, not much can be done, even by a scientifically trained leadership.

The great problem before our civilization, then, is the raising of the general level of culture of the masses along these lines as quickly as it can be done. We are fond of quoting Mr. Wells and saying that our civilization has become a race between education and catastrophe; but we neglect to say that not every sort of education can save our civilization from disaster. Education in the lore of the past and in the physical sciences can do little to save our civilization. Our civilization hangs upon the outcome of the race between catastrophe and social, political, moral, and religious education; and these are just the kinds of education which we have been neglecting. It may go down. But, if it does go down, it is safe to say that some other people will

profit by our fall. Just as we profited by the fall of Greco-Roman civilization, so the Chinese of some future age may possibly profit by our calamity, if calamity does overtake us. But though it suffers setback, civilization itself will go on; for history is a process of experience; and men learn by experience, even though it be calamity.



CHAPTER III  
THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE



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### THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE

IF man is to perfect his culture, he must perfect the controls over culture. These are to be found chiefly in the nonmaterial, or "spiritual," phases of culture, especially in science and education, government and law, religion and morality. As long as such social illiteracy prevails among the masses of mankind that they have no appreciation of the part which these agencies of social control play in human society, there is no hope of securing even their rational development. To be sure, when anything goes wrong in the social world, people turn to these agencies for help, especially to government and law, or coercive authority. But so imperfect is our social education that even in the United States the average citizen maintains as a rule a negative attitude toward one or more of these agencies of control, and toward the others only a half-intelligent attitude. Science is one of these controls most commonly misunderstood. It is the acknowledged basis of our material civilization. Can it become the basis of our spiritual civilization?

Perhaps it is unfortunate that the word "science" ever came into our language; for certain traditions and orthodoxies have in recent years grown up about

the word which tend to narrow its meaning unduly. The word originally meant simply "knowledge"; but by common consent knowledge is not knowledge in the social and cultural sense until it is tested and verifiable. The knowledge which comes by individual experience is often so faulty and fragmentary that only the knowledge tested by the experience of many, and then only by methods which minimize emotion and prejudice, is found in the long run to be trustworthy and worthy to be called "science." It is "science" in this broad sense of "tested knowledge" whose rôle in civilization we wish to discuss. We shall be only incidentally concerned with science in any narrower sense.

In this broad sense of "tested knowledge" science is fundamental in the process of culture development. Man has always lived by knowledge; and he can live in no other way and remain human. Knowledge is the basis of all his successful adjustments except the few made upon the animal levels of instinct, emotion, or accident. It is also the chief means by which man corrects his errors. Adequate knowledge means the elimination of error and success in making adjustments. It is therefore the great source of all mastery over nature, and we believe that in the future it will be the greatest means of controlling human nature and human relations.

The growth of tested knowledge, while it is in

civilization the pearl of great price, has been very slow in our human world. It is often said that all of primitive man's conceptions were theological and mythological. But this is a mistake. Some tested knowledge regarding the arts of life accompanied the development of those arts from the very beginning. Then, too, it is wrong to put in absolute opposition the magical and theological with the scientific. What we call the magical and theological even among the most primitive peoples often contained elements of tested knowledge. But primitive man had no means of testing his knowledge except by the crudest methods, and therefore what he believed to be knowledge was usually heavily laden with errors. Moreover, uncivilized man had no means of accumulating knowledge except oral tradition. Again, nomadic life, war, and other social disturbances in early history interrupted the transmission and accumulation of knowledge. Even after the invention of writing progress in the accumulation of tested knowledge was very slow. The Egyptians and Babylonians made a beginning and, along with the Greeks, invented many methods of measurement. But even among the Greeks the amount of tested knowledge was very small if judged by our standards. It was not until the invention of printing in the fifteenth century and the nearly simultaneous invention of certain "instruments of precision" that tested knowledge began to

accumulate rapidly and to receive widespread diffusion; and it was not until the seventeenth century, the "Century of Genius," that the scientific movement got fully under way.

Science, therefore, has been the latest phase of culture to receive development, and it seems at first glance absurd to conclude that science is bound to dominate all the other phases of culture. But if we understand the nature of man and the nature of science we will see why this is so. Man is an animal that lives by experience and by what he learns from experience rather than by ready-made reactions furnished by his germ plasm. Science is the tested knowledge that comes from experience, by using any and all methods which will reduce to a minimum errors of judgment. It is experience tested, verified, and universalized. It must lie back, therefore, of every art, and it must sit in judgment upon every human mood and upon every form of human conduct. It is, in brief, organized intelligence; and while man cannot live through intelligence alone, he will be successful in his living in proportion as he is guided by the accumulated and organized intelligence of mankind. Tested knowledge is, therefore, if our civilization continues to develop, destined to work revolutions in all departments of human thought and action and to become the guiding element in the culture of the future. But if science is to assume this function, then it can be no



narrow discipline, hemmed in by orthodoxies and traditional methods; it must itself become a movement toward knowledge of all reality and take all verifiable knowledge for its province.

Yet the scientific movement still hesitates thus to broaden its scope. Elsewhere the writer has said: "Like all other phases of culture, science has been subject to all sorts of aberrations. Like all of culture, it has proceeded by trial and error. . . . Even during the nineteenth century science remained relatively undeveloped. It would be fair to say that it remained immersed in its beginning tasks, the exploration and understanding of physical nature, and scarcely arrived at seriously undertaking the exploration and understanding of human life itself. Indeed, there are still many who hold that science can concern itself only with the material and the physical; that it must rigorously exclude from its consideration the psychic or the mental. Evidently science still remains strongly influenced by metaphysical and personal prejudices. It has not yet, at least in a majority of scientific men, attained to the completely open mind."<sup>1</sup>

"Behaviorism" in psychology and sociology illustrates the truth of these statements; for behaviorism in its pure form aims at the total exclusion of the mental or psychic from the field of human

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<sup>1</sup>"Cultural Evolution: A Study of Social Origins and Development," pp. 246, 247. The Century Company, 1927.

science. It therefore would exclude a part of reality from the attention of science. Yet behaviorism has become very popular among the younger psychologists and sociologists. In spite of its repudiation by the older psychologists, and even by some of our most eminent biologists, most of the younger psychologists to-day are making haste to climb into the band wagon of behaviorism. Yet it is manifestly a hang-over from the nineteenth-century conception of the nature of science and of scientific method. The scientific movement, instead of showing a tendency to take all verifiable knowledge for its province, would appear to be going to-day in the opposite direction, or, at least, to be keeping close to nineteenth-century scientific traditions. It must be granted that this is the present trend, and moreover that this trend tends to become established as an orthodoxy. It may even be granted that, so far as the mechanistic method and point of view in science succeeds in obtaining tested, verifiable knowledge, it will command respect and become established. What right have we to expect that science will free itself from restricting orthodoxies and will expand its scope? The answer is that it may not in our time, because orthodoxies when once established in any line of thought are hard to get rid of; but that the probability is that orthodoxies which restrict free inquiry in any line will be outgrown in time because history is a learning process.

Man, as we said, is an animal that lives by experience, and science is at bottom tested, verified, and universalized experience. This is why it is useful to man, and we may be sure that any attempt to make it anything less will fail in the long run. This is also why we may be sure that any narrow behaviorism in the human sciences will prove to be but a passing fad. What man desires and needs is tested and verifiable experience along every line. But if the whole field of tested and verifiable knowledge be given to science, then what effects may we expect it to have on the other phases of culture, and what new trends in science may we expect to develop?

In the sense of tested knowledge, science may be compared to light in the physical world. It illumines all objects and shows the path of safety as well as dangers. It enables us, therefore, to descry practical values. While it cannot furnish us with motives, it may modify our motives. It can even indicate to us possible consequences, and so in part reveal the future. It may, therefore, reveal to us our responsibilities and become a basis for our faith and hopes as well as for our fears.

All this is equivalent to saying that scientific knowledge has a vital bearing upon both our morality and our religion. But this is denied by both the scientific and religious dogmatist. Science, they say, can take no account of moral and religious

values. But these are the very values upon which science in the sense of tested knowledge does cast its light. Let us at this point content ourselves by carrying out our figure. If we compare science to light, we may well compare religion to vision, not of course the vision of immediate things, but of the remote, the future, and the unseen. So Professor Whitehead says: "Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real and yet waiting to be realized; something which is remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good and yet is beyond all reach."<sup>2</sup>

Now, just as physical light is necessary to physical sight, so the light of knowledge is necessary for that imaginative vision which gives rise to our religious faith, if we wish that vision to be sane and true and our faith a reasonable one. Thus may tested knowledge become a foundation for religious faith and science become a more and more dominating factor in the religion of the future. To say that "religion and science are mutually exclusive terms,"<sup>3</sup> and that "no union between them is possible," is, therefore, as gross a blunder as to say that knowledge and

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<sup>2</sup> "Science and the Modern World," pp. 275.

<sup>3</sup> Wallace, "The Scientific World View," p. 4.

faith are mutually exclusive terms and have no interconnections. But we shall return to this question in a later chapter.

Even closer is the bearing of science upon morality. If science is tested knowledge, then it should help us to discriminate values; its light should show us the way of safety, not only in the physical world, but also in human relations; not only for the individual, but also for nations. Tested knowledge will not only show us the way of physical and mental health; it can also show us the way of harmony, efficiency, and mutual helpfulness in human relations. Thus right and wrong, in a relative rather than an absolute sense, become scientific categories.

But here we must see also the limitations of science. The light of tested knowledge cannot furnish us with motives, though it may make our motives intelligent. Value is a creation of mind and attaches to objects and situations because of some fundamental human desire. Science can show us the way of bodily health, for example; but if we prefer death, then the way of health will have no value for us. Again, science can show us the way to harmony in human relations, given normal desires and wishes; but if some of us prefer conflict to peace and harmony with our fellow men, then the way which leads to harmony will for us have no value. To be sure, science may show us the genesis and even the danger and futility of some of our desires;

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but it is evident that the values which science helps us to discriminate must be practical and relative rather than absolute. The values of science are values only when we postulate the values of common sense; such as, that life is better than death, that health is better than disease, and that success in life adjustments is better than failure. But if morality is fundamentally a social matter, as practically all ethicists now recognize, then the social sciences must be the chief basis for a science of ethics.

But we are told that science is limited strictly to quantitative measurements and can have nothing to do with the social quality or value of our acts, and so nothing to do with morality. We are further told that more and more scientists are limiting themselves to what can be measured; that scientists are placing this limitation voluntarily upon themselves; and that science is naturally and necessarily what scientists say it is. This, we have seen, is the position of Dr. C. E. Ayres in the book which we have already mentioned, "Science the False Messiah." It is also the position of not a few philosophical and religious thinkers, who seem to find in this limitation of science the solution of many of their difficulties.

One obvious reply is that scientists themselves are divided. The "orthodox" scientists, as we may call them, would apparently limit the field of science to



the measurement of objective conditions and the formulation of laws in such relations. They would not recognize the subjective or the world or values as within the field of science. Other scientists, however, do not hesitate to include such values, for example, as health and wealth within the scientific field. Indeed, the whole science of economics has been built upon the concept of economic value. Inasmuch as our social life is a life of values in all its phases, and is made possible only through the exchange of experiences between individuals, any study of it except in the most superficial terms necessarily must take the experiences and valuations of individuals into account. Thus far, in other words, the social sciences, whether they discuss markets, wars, governments, religions, or other institutions, have been written in terms of human experience, and so in terms of values. It is for this reason that some, like Dr. Ayres, would deny the name of science to such studies, no matter how carefully they are made.

Here again we see the danger to clear thinking which may inhere in a word. The real question is, of course, not what meaning we should attach to the word "science," but whether we can get tested, verifiable knowledge in the world of our subjective and social experiences, and so in the world of values. Hardly any one would say that we do not have tested and verifiable knowledge as regards health,

though health is obviously a value; and he would be very rash who would say to an economist that we have no tested knowledge as yet regarding wealth and economic values. Moreover, this tested knowledge does not consist always, or even in a majority of cases, of quantitative measurements. Quantitative measurements, indeed, are increasingly sought for by students in these fields; but they themselves would be the first to acknowledge that quantitative measurements in these fields are much desired because they are largely lacking, even though our knowledge of these fields in a general way is considerable.

Here questions as to scientific method naturally arise. What are the most fruitful methods of obtaining verifiable knowledge in the social sciences? *methods of obtaining knowledge + historical* Auguste Comte said that it was the historical method, but the historical method is obviously almost wholly devoid of quantitative measurements. *historical* Then there is the method of "the participant observer," which is one element in the historical method, and which can tell us so much about events and the behavior of groups, without again quantitative measurements. *views + questionnaire* Then there is the method of the interview and the questionnaire, which can tell us so much about social behavior and its motives. Even the method of statistics, which aims at quantitative measurements of social phenomena, obviously depends upon the methods of the interview and

of the eyewitness. If these latter methods are worthless from a scientific point of view, then so also the method of statistics. Our United States census, for example, is valueless if the method of the interview is not to be trusted, because the census largely is made up of the results of interviews. It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question of scientific methods further. These illustrations are sufficient to show that there are many ways of getting tested knowledge other than by the quantitative measurement of objective conditions, and other than by the methods employed in the physical sciences. The only question which remains is whether we should call such tested knowledge "science" or not.

This question concerns the whole future of science. The scientific movement seems to show the same tendencies shown by all other social movements in history. Every historical movement starts with some new enthusiasm, or hope, which reaches out in every direction and brings everything within the movement which may in any way serve its purpose. When the first enthusiasm is spent the movement settles down into fixed habits which are supported by strong traditions. Gradually there grows up an orthodoxy regarding what the movement stands for, and, in order to hold their lines more securely, some leaders of the movement make the orthodoxy a very narrow one. This is evidently what occurred in the Christian movement, and we now see it being re-

peated in the scientific movement. Strangely enough, however, the orthodox scientists seem quite unaware that they are the victims of a hardening and a narrowing tradition. It is possible, of course, that the narrow interpretation of the scientific field for which they stand may prevail; that the scientists of the future will limit science strictly to the field of quantitative measurements. If they do so, then science can play a rôle only in the exact arts. I would not say that its rôle would be of decreasing importance, but it could have little bearing upon those deeper problems of life which concern qualities and values.

There is, however, good reason to hope that if the light of knowledge continues to increase in our world, narrow orthodoxies in both science and religion will in time disappear. Just as we have seen narrow orthodoxies in religion breaking up in our own day, so probably a not distant future will see the disappearance of tendencies to narrow orthodoxies in science. For men, if allowed to think freely, will see that the scientific spirit is the open-minded love of truth and is quite independent of the straight-jacket of any method. Moreover, they will see that if science does not take all verifiable knowledge for its field, then men will seek such knowledge elsewhere; for men can live in our complex world only by tested knowledge, and if science will not furnish it to them in the world of qualities

and values, then some other instrument of culture will attempt to furnish it, and science will sink to second-rate importance in the guidance of life.

This is apparently exactly what some people desire; for they say if science assumes first importance in the guidance of life it will exercise an unheard-of tyranny over men. Let science confine itself to exact facts and relations, and let each individual evaluate these for himself. Let science keep out of the world of values, and let each individual, or group of individuals, decide values as it chooses. Only in this way, we are told, can we preserve freedom. But, so far as science has assumed the guidance of life, it has thus far created no tyranny; and it is difficult to understand how it could do so if science identifies itself with tested knowledge. For knowledge makes truth evident, and truth makes men free. In the matter of health and disease, for example, science has not only discovered facts, but has evaluated conditions of living as regards health. No one has felt this as a tyranny except possibly those who prefer to believe in ancient superstitions.

People have been told not to drink polluted water if they wish to avoid typhoid fever. But no one who wishes typhoid fever has been forbidden to drink polluted water. To be sure, the law, under the guidance of science, has forbidden people to give polluted water to others to drink; but this is fair,

and not tyranny, because most people are guided by the values of common sense—that is, they prefer life to death, and health to disease.

Now the case is exactly the same with the whole field of morals. The guidance of science in the field of conduct and of social relations could be resented as a tyranny only by those who prefer to be guided in their conduct by ancient superstitions and by unenlightened impulses and emotions. For tested knowledge, even when it concerns conduct values, places no external constraint upon the will; it only enlightens it. Nor is it true that science, if accepted as the guide of life, would stunt the growth of art, morals, politics, and religion. On the contrary, when these are provided a scientific base through a critical analysis of human experience in these lines, we have good reason for believing that such scientific knowledge will aid greatly in the rational development of these phases of culture. Thus, for example, a science of religion will aid greatly in the rational development of religion. Such a science, by providing a knowledge basis for the development of religion, would in time come to be regarded as an indispensable part of religion, while at the same time it would remain a part of science. Thus the tree of knowledge might come in time to furnish nourishment to all the branches of culture which spring from its trunk. We cannot agree, therefore, with Ayres that by trying to make our beliefs scientific we will



make them absurd and powerless. Rather, belief is too often powerless to-day because it is not in accord with tested knowledge.

Another historical parallel may be suggested here. Just as the Christian movement developed its narrow dogmatisms before it had reached its perfection, so the scientific movement shows similar tendencies. For, of course, our science is still very immature, and narrow views on the part of scientific men are often due to traditionalism and resistance to the process of growth. Hitherto our science has been mainly physical science, and there has been unwillingness on the part of the workers in the physical sciences to recognize the social sciences. This has led to the desire on the part of some workers in the social field to use only physical science methods and thus assert their right to be called "scientists." And such "scientists," as Bernard Shaw has said, often "actually regarded the banishment of mind from the universe as a glorious enlightenment and emancipation." Thus science ceased to be an all-sided movement toward knowledge of reality and tended to become a narrow specialism linked with the machine and with the mechanical view of things.

Thus has come about largely the present plight of science and its present needless conflicts with other phases of culture. Science can escape from its present plight and from these conflicts only by becoming an open-minded movement toward knowl-

edge of all reality and welcoming all methods which will assure such knowledge. But inasmuch as the most important part of reality for human beings is the human world, it is evident that if science thus broadens its scope the physical sciences will fall to a place of secondary importance. Physical science can never be the guide of life, because it leaves culture largely out of account, and all of the most important values of the human world are wrapped up in culture; yes, even in the nonmaterial aspects of culture. A social science even which employs only the methods of physical science cannot guide us, because it will miss the nonmaterial aspects of culture and end in negations.

It is, of course, impossible to say whether or not the scientific movement will emancipate itself from the narrow dogmatisms which now threaten it. But if history involves a learning process which gradually corrects mistakes, this would seem probable. Then we could expect a development of the social sciences, largely in terms of history rather than in terms of mathematics and quantitative measurement. The sciences of culture rather than of physical nature would take the lead and have preëminence. Not only would each aspect of material culture have its supporting science, but also each aspect of non-material culture. Thus there would be pure sciences of government, of religion, of morals, and even of fine art and of education, and supporting all would

be sciences of human relations, of human group life, and of culture itself. These studies would be recognized as having the same scientific validity as the sciences of physical nature.

It may seem to some that we have already reached this stage, or, at least, that it is immediately in the future. We may, of course, hope that this is true; but the strong movement in the scientific world to limit science to the external and the quantitative, as well as the strong movements in art, in politics, in morals, and in religion, to deny any dependence upon science, should warn us that the social sciences are still far from established. Only one of the non-material phases of culture definitely looks to science for guidance, and that is education, and it has not done so until recently.

Yet we have already seen that the great need of our present civilization is to develop as quickly as possible the nonmaterial, or spiritual, phases of culture, especially government and law, education, morality, and religion. The only possible way to develop these phases of culture is to accumulate and diffuse as much tested knowledge concerning them as possible. Naturally such knowledge will concern these great phases of culture and will seek to show how each of their historical forms functions in given social circumstances.

The opponent of science having anything to do with the practical problems of our world will proba-

bly at this point hold up his hands with holy horror, and exclaim: "What! science indicate the relative social values in democracy and autocracy, Sovietism and Fascism, hedonism and intuitionism, Confucianism and Buddhism, Mohammedanism and Christianity! Why, that would make science a partisan affair and win for science only the enmity of the partisans of these systems." The reply is that science cannot attain to a true non-partisanship by remaining aloof from all questions which have partisans. If it did, it would remain aloof from all vital social questions, because it is a constant characteristic of vital questions that they have partisans. If science is going to remain aloof from all questions of politics, of morals, and of religion, then it cannot function as a guide in life, to say nothing of being helpful in the development of these phases of our culture. Even such a general science as sociology will be a useless and "dead" science if it can contribute nothing to the solution of the political, moral, and religious problems of human society. If Fascism and Sovietism, democracy and autocracy, cannot be socially evaluated upon the basis of established social knowledge, how will these problems of governmental forms be solved? It is as cowardly for the social scientist to refuse to deal with such vital questions of human welfare with the best scientific methods available as it would be for

the medical or biological scientist to refuse to deal with a pestilence.

If tested knowledge is to benefit man, and if science may be identified with tested knowledge, then the great field for science in the future will be human relations. The tasks of physical science are, of course, far from completion, and the urgent needs of men in the way of food, power, and physical health will probably put large demands on the physical sciences in the near future. Still the demands of social life with its increasing complexities and difficulties are even more urgent. One cannot visit Europe and witness its overpopulation, the poverty and ignorance of its masses, its international and interracial hatreds and antagonisms, without realizing that if scientific knowledge cannot help in the solution of these problems the outlook is indeed dark. And I am forced to add that I could discover little or no evidence in most of the countries of Europe of the leadership of the social sciences in the solution of these problems. Science is still far from a dominating element in the life of most of these peoples. When we turn to the United States we find the situation changed, but not essentially different. We have more completely absorbed the results of the physical sciences and created a machine civilization. But the social ignorance, the poverty, the lawlessness, intolerance, and antagonism of our masses and classes persist, and become all

*Human Relations*



the more dangerous because we have a machine civilization. The very advance of physical science, as Professor Soddy declares, has become a menace to our civilization if our present low social standards persist. We must have more social intelligence, more tested social knowledge, and more agreement regarding social problems if our civilization is going to have even a chance of developing in a satisfactory way.

It is pathetic under such circumstances to find the leaders in the human sciences just at present apparently hopelessly divided among themselves. There are a full half-dozen different kinds of psychology to-day, each claiming scientific standing and each hostile to all the other kinds; and the same condition exists in sociology. Our scientific world to-day is as badly divided as our religious, political, and social. But it could hardly be otherwise; for these divisions are but indications that the method of development in our human world is the trial and error method. These divisions do not indicate the failure or the "bankruptcy" of science, as its critics so often proclaim; they may rather be signs of growth. In part the divisions are due to one-sidedness in viewing reality, to the fact that each faction in science, quite like each sect in the religious world, sees but a part of the truth; but even more are these divisions due to the different methods and assumptions which different students of human behavior



employ. Scientists in general seem surprisingly ignorant of the fact that science usually develops through trial and error. Especially do the advocates of the latest method or the latest theory in some science seem painfully ignorant of this fact; for they advocate these with all the fervor of converts to a new religion. They are certain that they are right, whereas most of us only see reason to lament that the scientific movement is made the victim of fads and fashions. But if our European mind is too dogmatic to rise above these fads of the hour to a true synthesis, if we are unable to see reality and see it whole, we may be sure not only that the scepter of knowledge will pass from us, but that some other race than ours will in time learn from our mistakes.

The great development of science in the future must be, therefore, in the humanistic direction. This trend is in evidence even in the physical sciences. The human sciences themselves will more and more come to center their attention upon the distinctively human as the basis for man's further progress and development. Culture, in all its aspects, as we have already indicated, will become the center of scientific attention, and the subject matter of a group of sciences, the sciences of culture, which will repudiate the method of the physical sciences, the method of weighing and measuring, as adequate for their purposes. Among the phases of culture, the non-material, or "spiritual," are the

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most distinctively human; therefore they will receive the special attention of humanistic science, and the group of social sciences concerned with these nonmaterial phases of culture will be held to be most important to humanity.

Now in these nonmaterial phases of culture and in human relations generally the great need is a set of standards which will enable us to judge and control conduct to human social advantage. The sciences of the nonmaterial phases of culture will therefore become the basis of a set of social sciences concerned with standardization. The work of sciences of standardization in the physical field, or more strictly in the field of material culture, is already far advanced. But, as we have seen, there are still many who deny that we can have sciences of standards in such fields of human conduct as government, morals, and religion; and that, if we did have them, we would have an intolerable tyranny. It is impossible, however, to see how mankind can ultimately avoid the determination of standards upon the basis of tested knowledge in these fields. We doubtless should leave a large freedom to the individual. But this principle does not prevent the scientific determination of standards. In at least two of the nonmaterial phases of culture the scientific determination of standards is already far advanced. I refer to education and social work. In both of these fields the testing of experience, the sifting of

facts, and generalization from these has led to the establishment of many helpful standards, even though we may concede that the work is as yet only begun. In charitable or philanthropic work, which is one of the most delicate and difficult of all human relations, the same procedure has resulted in well-established scientific standards. Nobody, it may be remarked, has found any tyranny in establishing standards in these lines of conduct except the few who wish to act upon impulse, or old habits.

In a word, if science becomes once thoroughly humanistic, the whole field of relative standards, values, and ideals in human relations will become objects of scientific determination. The social sciences will expand in their normative and applied aspects. Why any one even now should dread this development is hard to see. If social standards, values, and ideals are not based upon tested knowledge, they will be based upon things quite untrustworthy. If, on the other hand, humanity can secure standards based upon tested knowledge in government, in morals, in religion, and in education, and can secure the general acceptance of these through education, then progress in civilization will enter upon a new phase, the telic phase which Lester F. Ward predicted. And there is good reason to believe that even the most perplexing problems of our civilization would soon be on the way to solution. Every phase of culture, nonmaterial as well as material,

would soon be headed toward the best development for the weal of man.

Whether our age or our race will carry through or not this broadening of the field of science, which we have described, it is impossible to predict. But it would seem certain that if history involves an accumulation of experience such a broadening of what is generally recognized as tested knowledge is certain to take place. Whether it will be called science or not is, of course, a matter of indifference. The important thing is that science in the name of its purity or orthodoxy do not put a ban upon the accumulation of such tested knowledge. Ample and accurate information, a great financier has said, is the foundation of success in the business world. We have every reason to believe that it is the foundation of success for nations and civilizations as well as for individuals. If science is unwilling to have the ample and accurate information necessary for successful human living sought, accumulated, and diffused under its name, then it will have to be done under some other name.

If, on the other hand, science identifies itself with the whole field of tested knowledge, then its function with reference to other phases of culture will become clear. The conflicts of science with these other phases will disappear. I have ventured to say elsewhere that between a humanistic science and a humanitarian religion there can be no conflict.

Certainly there could be no serious conflict. For between the tested knowledge regarding human welfare presented by such science and a religion which finds its expression in the service of mankind a natural and inevitable interdependence would arise. So, too, with a humanitarian ethics and a humanistic philosophy. A bridge of thoughts and values would grow up easily and naturally between science, morals, philosophy, and religion. Science, both as a knowledge of facts and a knowledge of practical values, would point clearly to standards of rational social conduct. But beyond the tested knowledge of facts and values of science would lie the ultimate problems of knowledge and of reality. This, I take it, would be the field of philosophy; and a philosophy which built itself upon total tested and verifiable human experience would be strong, not weak. It would be another bridge between science and religion. To religion then would belong our ultimate values. It would be our valuation of our universe, or, as Caird said, "the summed-up meaning and purport of our whole consciousness of things"; and if based upon tested and verifiable human experience, it could naturally have but little conflict with a science similarly based. The conflicts which we now find so commonly in the minds of individuals between their scientific knowledge, their ethical ideals, their philosophical beliefs, and their religious faith would disappear; for there

would be no arbitrary separations made between these; and they would be seen to form a natural series, which, when its parts are logically interconnected, forms also a harmonious whole. Thus science and religion would become one in spirit and in aim



## CHAPTER IV

### THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT



## CHAPTER IV

### THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT is that phase of civilization which has to do with external coercive social control. It represents the authority of the group, usually exercised in an external, coercive way, to enforce the will of the group upon its individual members. As the agency to enforce law, it is the last resort in controlling the conduct of individuals. It therefore provides the framework within which the life of the individual and of the group moves.

Yet so great is our illiteracy that very few citizens, even of the most advanced modern nations, understand the functions, purpose, and limitations of government. This is in part due to the history of government and to the traditions which have accompanied its development. So important, however, is this framework or coercive authority for group welfare that it is impossible to perfect our social culture unless we perfect government. Yet the "lag" in this phase of our spiritual culture is so great all over the world that it is as true to-day as when Lester F. Ward said it, "In politics, we are still in the Stone Age." Indeed, in politics, as in many other things, our world seems to have ret-

rograded during the last twenty-five years.<sup>1</sup> A quarter of a century ago hardly anyone in the more advanced nations would have doubted that the ultimate form of government among mankind would be democratic. But to-day our democracy finds itself rudely challenged by Sovietism, on the one hand, and Fascism, on the other, while intellectuals in every country vie with each other in expressing skepticism, and even contempt, for democratic government. If the world is muddled in regard to its religion, morals, and science, it is even more muddled in its politics; and this muddling is not confined to its masses, but affects even the leaders of its most cultured classes. What is the cause of this? And what will be the probable outcome? Were the dreams of the founders of this nation simply another mistake in culture?

As soon as we turn to the history of government we begin to get some light upon our present situation. All human societies have had law in the form of custom almost from the very beginning. But government as we know it was a relatively late invention which arose and developed with warfare. Almost from the first formal government and military authority have been closely allied. The very earliest human groups, however, were peaceful, and,

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<sup>1</sup>It has been pointed out that, in terms of population, two-thirds of the world that professed democracy in 1918 have since repudiated democracy, and that without any expressions of regret.

on account of their distance from one another and other conditions of life, they rarely, if ever, attacked one another. But with the filling up of the world with people, and with the encroachment of human groups upon each other's territory and food supply, war became common. War necessitated the compact and efficient organization of the group and the placing of authority in the hands of one man or a few men. After the lapse of ages the war chief became a monarch, and the whole organization and apparatus of the military life was transferred to the civil life. Despotism was developed when this military organization and the monarch were recognized as having divine right by the priesthood. Moreover, through one group conquering another the idea of sovereignty as an obedience-compelling power arose. Thus the whole custom of the conquering group plus its military regulations became the law for the conquered group as well as for the conquerors. The government of the conquerors became the agency for enforcing law, and thus arose the idea of the sovereign state.

This brief glance at the history of government and the state explains at once why the end of the state was conceived to be power, and why government has been so closely allied with military functions. Because the state in its history has been essentially a war organization, its policy has been dictated by success at any price; might, not right, has been the

object of politics. A Machiavelli could therefore rightfully claim that the politics which he knew had no relation with morals. This political tradition has persisted right down to the present time, and much in our world may well make us doubt whether we shall soon outgrow it.

The conception of the state as armed might, as bearing the sword of the Lord, naturally gave rise to similar attitudes on the part of citizens within the state. The functions of the state, or government, among its own citizens were considered to be limited to "police powers"—that is to say, to keeping order and punishing crime. Naturally the doctrine arose that that government was best which least interfered with its citizens, and that there would be no need of government if all men were good. Thus were laid the foundations of a doctrine of "anarchism," or that the ideal state of human society was one of no government. We find these doctrines indorsed not only by Luther and other leaders of the Reformation, but also by Jefferson and many of the fathers of our Republic. It is not to be wondered at that they have become a part of our political tradition, very difficult to uproot from the minds of the masses of our citizens. They obviously stand in the way of a civilized conception of the functions and purpose of government.

The conception of the end of the state as power, and as "bearing the sword of the Lord," gave rise



to many other separations of politics and ethics. Unscrupulous patriotism was advocated as the proper attitude of the citizen toward his government. "My country, right or wrong," was held to be the attitude of the good citizen. Moreover, these warlike attitudes carried over to the internal politics of state. When political parties came to be tolerated, they kept the ethics of war. Success at any price became their motto, and expediency their watchword. The very word "politics" came to have a moral stench about it. The present condition of the political world promises no early alleviation from these conditions. Several nations, Italy for example, instead of going forward to a Christian conception of government, seem reverting at the present time to the Roman or Machiavellian conception.

Quite evidently the problem before our immediate political future is how these political traditions, which are pagan rather than Christian, yet so ingrained in our culture, can be transformed into instruments of civilized government and of international coöperation. Quite evidently, too, we shall hardly succeed in doing this on a world-wide scale if we are not able to do it in our local politics. The conception of government and law as essentially social welfare agencies will have to be substituted for the conception of government as essentially military in character. The end of the state will have to be thought of as justice, not power, and the pur-

pose of government as social well-being, not merely as protection against enemies and the promotion of prosperity. Political parties should be associations to secure justice and welfare for all, and not mere conflict groups to secure selfish advantages for their own members. Patriotism should be regarded as a virtue only in so far as it leads to unselfish service, not simply of one's own state, but of all humanity.

What indications have we that such a transformation is taking place in our political traditions and institutions? That there have been many of recent years hardly any one would deny. But in the meanwhile events have been occurring in the political world which warn us against accepting the idea that the Christian humanitarian conception of the state and politics will have an easy triumph. Soviet Russia has proclaimed the dictatorship of a party under the specious pretense that the welfare of the manual workers is the welfare of society. While this dictatorship of the proletariat is said to be merely a stage in preparation for a true democracy, there are no indications that democracy in any form is likely to come into existence in Russia in the near future, if the Soviet remains in power. All the militaristic features of pagan statecraft have been annexed by the Soviet government, which, while holding the Russian masses in the iron hand of a military rule, calmly awaits another world war for a chance to extend its system over the earth. In

Italy also a party dictatorship has established a military government scarcely equaled in thoroughness and discipline since Roman times. Indeed, the model of the present Italian government is avowedly Roman. Here no longer is any pretense made of dictatorship being a preparation for democracy. On the contrary, every one is told that democracy in all of its forms has failed and is out of date; that it never has really been established in any country and that its pursuit has been one of the inexplicable delusions of history; that beyond the rule of the people is the rule of the competent and the qualified, which the Fascist *régime* exemplifies. Leading exponents of Fascism, with Mussolini's approval, have even gone so far as to say that everything political outside the Roman pattern is an error. That means that the French Revolution with its political ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity was a mistake; that the Protestant Reformation with its ideal of a free Church in a free state was also a mistake; and even that Christian political ideals in general are mistaken. Never has democracy in all its forms been challenged so boldly, so determinedly, and so logically as by the present Fascist *régime* in Italy. A party of a little over a million in a population of over forty million, with militaristic, autocratic methods has produced overnight wonders in sanitation, industrial efficiency, and law enforcement and then says to the world,

"Behold! the proper method of governing mankind!" It, too, calmly awaits future disturbances for the chance to extend the Fascist system throughout the world.

In our own United States there seems to be an increasing number of business men and intellectuals who come perilously near agreeing with the Fascist party of Italy and who would apparently like to see something like the Fascist *régime* set up in this country. Indeed, the chief authority cited by the ex-Kaiser of Germany in his diatribes against democracy appears to be our own Mr. H. L. Mencken. And Mr. Mencken has been described as "the impassioned spokesman of all that culture which has finally taken up its residence in American urban life." It is a bit disconcerting to find the defenders of autocracy in Europe citing American intellectual leaders as their authority. It would seem that, even if we have not yet joined the reaction toward autocracy, we are in danger of doing so.

All of which makes one suspect that the day of authoritarian government is not yet over and that democratic principles even in the realm of politics will have no easy triumph over autocratic. Most Americans still hope that this is not true; and it may not be, if America gives stronger support to, and better demonstration of, democratic principles than it has yet done. Let us note, however, that these new experiments in autocracy do not repudiate

the social welfare conception of government. On the contrary, their claim is that they are vastly more efficient as agencies of social welfare than any form of democratic government could possibly be. The idea that the mass of people know wherein their welfare consists and can rule themselves, the exponents of Fascism would tell us, has been disproved both by political experience and by the work of the mental testers, which shows that the mass of the people are and must remain children in their powers of judgment. The patriotic, the successful, the possessing classes should rule, because they have shown themselves competent and because they will know better than the people themselves what is for the good of the whole country. Fascists say that they want "a government for the people, over the heads of the people, and, if necessary, against the people." Nearly the same formula would be accepted by the Soviet rulers, although the Bolsheviks would select very different classes than the Fascists to pass upon what is good for the people.

Apparently, then, the social welfare conception of government is secure for the immediate future, though strangely enough it is now the new autocracies rather than the old representative democracies which emphasize this conception. It is now only in the representative democracies that we find selfish interest groups free to act; for in the new autocracies the welfare of all is administered by the

iron hand of military rule. This is, of course, nothing new; for autocracies have long boasted that they knew best how to look after the welfare of the people. Witness the boasts of Imperial Germany and of Czarist Russia. If benevolent autocracy is the best form of government, as intellectuals have often claimed, then it is fast arriving. But deeper questions remain. Is benevolent, socially minded autocracy the final form of government? If not, can autocracy prepare for democracy or self-government?

To take up the last question first. There is little evidence that autocracy in and of itself can prepare for self-government. We do not learn to govern ourselves by having other people govern us—at least only to a limited extent—usually it weakens us. The boy in the family, for example, cannot become a man by having the father's judgment and conscience constantly take the place of his own. Yet this very illustration suggests a qualification. The government of the family is probably wisely autocratic so far as the younger children are concerned. The older children are best prepared for life by gradually releasing them from parental control and placing them upon their own responsibility. When given their freedom, they must be expected to make some mistakes; but they learn from these very mistakes and gradually fit themselves to assume the responsibilities of life. So it is with nations. His-



tory, as we said, is a learning process; and the only way to learn successfully the art of self-government is to practice it. Autocracy does not fit for freedom, but this is not to deny that autocracy may sometimes be best for peoples that are culturally and morally immature, and that the freeing of those peoples should be a gradual process of practicing them in the responsibilities of self-government.

The great condemnation of autocracy, then, as a form of government is that it keeps the people politically children. No matter how benevolent it is, it does not favor the development of personality. It would keep the masses perpetually in tutelage, and hence it arrests their social and cultural evolution. It may, of course, be said that all political experience has shown that the masses are children, and, as we have seen, the work of the mental testers is cited as final scientific proof of this contention. But historical experience never shows what a people may become, neither does mental testing. The most that mental testing can show is the *present* mental and cultural condition of a people. Scientifically we cannot say what maturity of political judgment may be developed in the masses of a people who have enjoyed proper social and political education. We know, of course, that the actual work of government is, under all of its forms, always performed by a few. But under a democracy the masses have some

voice in selecting these few, while under an autocracy they have little or no voice.

There is, after all, a vast difference between democratic and autocratic leadership. The democratic leader depends upon the opinion and will of his group; the autocratic leader upon the coercive power of his position and authority. The democratic leader must await the development of appreciation and intelligent judgment in the masses. No such handicap attaches to autocracy. The autocratic leader looks, not to the development of intelligence and personality in the masses, but rather to his own intelligence and personality and the subserviency of the masses. The very strength of autocracy depends upon the weakness and subserviency of the masses. This is true of all autocratic systems, whether in the state, in the Church, or in industry.

Another reason why autocracy cannot prepare for democracy now becomes manifest; and that is that autocratic governments in order to retain their power almost inevitably are forced to control all other phases of culture. They develop and practice a theory of absolute sovereignty. They bring under subjection and control education, religion, the press, industry, and practically all other cultural activities. None of these are permitted free and independent development. Hence cultural evolution is arrested or perverted in the interest of a ruling class. Both Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy are good examples.

Each has taken away liberty of thought, speech, and publication from the average citizen and attempted to make both education and religion subservient to the state.

Democracies, on the other hand, are supposed to leave free these phases of culture to pursue an independent development; and in proportion as they do not do so they lose their character as democracies. To be sure, democracies for their own protection are forced to support systems of education; but they are not supposed to dictate what opinions shall be taught in the schools, and again in proportion as they do so they lose their character as democracies. A free school and freedom of teaching are not less necessary for a democracy than a free church and freedom of prophesying. Autocracies cannot prepare for self-government, because they keep the whole cultural as well as the political life of the individual in tutelage. Democracies, on the other hand, encourage every individual to think and judge for himself, and they thus free the whole cultural process. Democracies may result, therefore, temporarily in many aberrant developments in civilization; but in the long run they promote cultural evolution, since free variation is the basis of all evolution. Democratic states, if they are democratic, establish no absolute sovereignty in their governments. They respect the rights of minorities, of groups, and of individuals. They leave the social and cultural life

of individuals relatively free and depend much upon the political intelligence and socialized character of their citizens. They are therefore relatively weak for purposes of war, but relatively strong in the work of peace.

The autocratic state is ruled by the mind or opinion of a relatively small group, or party, who constitute its governing class. Soviet Russia or Fascist Italy are again splendid examples. If the state were an organism, like the human body, as has often been claimed, there would be a scientific foundation for autocracy in the nature of human society. But human societies are not organisms, and the more sociological investigation proceeds, the more does it show that there is not even a real analogy between a human group and a biological organism. Because human groups are made up of relatively independent, autonomous, self-conscious individuals, their corporate action is best secured through the conscious coördination and coöperation of their individual members. Ultimately, therefore, human groups, like human individuals, must be ruled by their own minds; and the mind or opinion of the group is nothing mysterious, but simply the integrated opinion of the mass of its members. There is basis, therefore, in the nature of group life, for the belief that every human group must ultimately find its government in its own opinion—that is, in some form of democracy. Just as one individual

may for a time be ruled by the mind of another individual, though not for a long time without a weakening effect, so a political group may for a time be ruled by a small party or class without disaster, though not after cultural and social maturity is reached. Autocracy can be made permanent only on condition that the mass of the people be kept children—that is, culturally and socially immature. Democracy, on the other hand, depends upon the development of personality in the mass of individuals. It invites every man to be free and to share in the making of the opinion which shall rule the action of the group. Whether human societies will ultimately be governed democratically or autocratically will, therefore, depend upon their social aims, and so ultimately upon their ethics and religion. If we want every individual to have his social personality fully developed and to realize as far as possible the best life, then we must cultivate democracy and make it successful in government. If, on the other hand, we are content with a caste society, in which the good life remains the privilege of a few, then autocracy is the appropriate form of government.

It would seem that the forces of normal social evolution are on the side of democracy. If the development of individual personality and culture continues, a voice in the conduct of government will undoubtedly be demanded by every people. If, however, the

conditions of life, whether through war, through lack of economic and educational opportunities, or through low forms of morals and religion, keep the masses socially and culturally degraded, then we may expect that self-government will fail to develop, or, if it is attempted, will end in failure. The success of democracy altogether depends upon the general level of culture. Democratic government, if it is to succeed, must be the rule of an intelligent public opinion. Democratic government cannot be mere organized authority, or it will lose its character as democratic. It must be also organized intelligence, for it presupposes the intelligent coöperation of the whole mass of the people in the work of government. When religion remains theological and other-worldly, when ethics is individualistic and unsocialized, when social and political education is confined to a few, it is too much to expect democracy to work well; for democracy in a complex society such as ours depends absolutely upon the culture and enlightenment of the masses.

There can be no doubt therefore that the realization of successful democratic government will be a slow process; but if human development continues, so far as the student of human society can discern, the coming of democratic government is inevitable. It was probably inevitable that autocracy or absolutism should be tried out in the development of government; and probably the world as a whole is not



yet ready for democracy. But it is plain that in the long run human groups must be ruled by their own minds—that is, by more or less rational opinions formed by the group as a whole. As the culture of the masses increases we may expect demands for self-government to increase in every land. At first there will be many flounderings and failures in these attempts at self-government. Everything that man does he does at first awkwardly. There is no natural form of government; and self-government is one of the most difficult of all arts to learn. But if the experience of history involves a process of learning, even this art can be learned by the masses of mankind.

Yet democratic government must perform successfully all the necessary functions of government, if it is going to win approval in the experience of mankind. While the functions of government are as wide as human interests, in so far as these interests can be safeguarded by external control, yet in the modern world the chief functions of government come mainly under four heads: (1) The maintenance of order and justice between individuals and groups within the state; (2) the defense of the state against external aggression; (3) the promotion of the economic welfare of all classes within the state; (4) the promotion of education and the diffusion of knowledge. Many of our forefathers, as we have already seen, thought the work of democratic government

was limited to the first two of these functions;<sup>2</sup> but it is safe to say that any modern government which fails in any one of the above four principal functions will be judged as failing completely. The state, which began as a war organization, has now become transformed into a great organization for the work of peace. Let us see what this means.

In the first place, any government in the future which does not succeed in keeping peace and order among its citizens and between its constituent groups will be judged a failure. Negatively this means that democratic governments must devote themselves to the solving of the problem of crime. It also means that vice, which is so often the ante-room of crime, must also be prevented and repressed so far as that can be done by legal means. Probably the government of Great Britain has progressed further in solving these problems than that of any other democratic nation. Notoriously the governments of the United States have failed in this matter. But the problem of crime cannot be solved without the positive promotion of justice between all individuals and classes within the state. Peace and harmony between individuals and classes must be promoted by constructive measures to facilitate

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<sup>2</sup>The more far-seeing leaders of eighteenth-century democracy, such as Washington and Jefferson, on the other hand, believed strongly in the promotion of education and the diffusion of knowledge.

the settlement of disputes and to further coöperation. Justice and the arbitration of disputes will therefore be made free to all classes, eventually, or at least to all who cannot afford to pay the state for such service. If one of the principal aims of government is justice, then legal services of all kinds will be made free to those who need such services and are unable to pay.

But peace and coöperation between the governments of the world, we are beginning to see, are not less important than peace and good will within the state. If democratic governments can go down because of the growth of crime and disorder within the state, they can still more easily go down through international war. For war is the mother of autocracy, and real democracy becomes impossible if war or the fear of war becomes constant. Moreover, when public revenues are eaten up by armaments and other preparations for war, when public energy is used up in the problem of defense, then there is little chance that government can devote itself to a constructive program of public welfare. Moreover, under the conditions of modern science and industry, a government can effectually protect its citizens now only by maintaining peace. War between nations is now equally disastrous to the victorious and to the vanquished. The maintenance of peace between nations has therefore become the greatest political issue of our time. Strangely

enough, as the experience of the United States shows, here the most democratic nations are peculiarly disadvantaged. Obviously the only way to establish peace among nations is to establish some control or government above the nations, which will keep peace and justice among them, just as peace and justice are kept within the state by law and government. War must be replaced by law as a method of settling international disputes. But if the people rule, they may not have enough social intelligence and good will to support law and government above the nations. Here the coöperation of a democratic nation in such international organization depends upon the political intelligence of the mass of the people, as we have found out. It also depends upon the love of peace in the hearts of the people. Hence democratic governments are dependent for the solution of this problem of peace not only upon education, but also upon religion. Democracies cannot survive when the level of the intelligence and the morality of the people is low. Democratic governments can rise only as high as their source, which is in the intelligence and character of the mass of their citizens.

Accordingly the welfare functions of government, especially the promotion of the economic well-being and education of all classes, must be the chief concern of democracies. When the mass of the people live in poverty, without opportunities for culture,

without perhaps even the minimum which is necessary for bodily welfare and normal mental development, neither the freedom nor the social and political idealism, which are the life of democracy, can exist. One of the first concerns of democratic governments must be to get rid of hopeless poverty and extend, so far as possible, the enjoyment of private property to all citizens. In other words, democracy, if it does sincerely aim at the protection of the rights of the common man, will aim to establish a national minimum standard of living which will make a normal physical, mental, and moral life possible for even the poorest class of its citizens. This will probably be the chief work upon which modern democratic governments will enter in the immediate future. They dare not neglect it; for the production of any large class whose children must grow up in hopeless poverty, without opportunities, and therefore without hope, imperils the very foundations of democratic government.

This doubtless means that democratic governments in order to survive must seriously apply themselves to the problems of the redistribution of wealth and the equalization of opportunity. Outside of revolution, we know of no way to redistribute wealth except through the drastic taxation of those classes who enjoy unearned and swollen incomes. Practically all democratic governments are applying this method, and without any dampening of achieve-

ment, as has been so often predicted. Probably the method will be carried still further in the near future, in spite of the hue and cry raised against it by selfish interests. Probably also democratic governments will more and more seek to equalize opportunity by systems of governmental insurance against accident, sickness, old age, and other vicissitudes of life. European democracies have already undertaken such insurance, and it is only prosperous America that thinks such safeguards against economic misfortune unnecessary. Probably also democratic governments will find it wise to extend gradually the scope of government industrial enterprises.

It is popular just now to denounce such government enterprises as socialistic and communistic. But there is no better way of bringing about a growth in the demand for communism or state socialism than by foolishly blocking the expansion of government enterprise when it becomes apparent that it would serve the welfare of the people. If Soviet communism is not to win out, democratic governments must demonstrate that they can serve equally well the welfare of all the people. Too great dogmatism as to the functions of government is always a handicap to its success, especially in a democracy.

But the work of government for the economic welfare of the people is superficial compared to the work which government should do to develop intelligence



and character in the mass of its citizens. Democratic governments, as we have seen, especially depend upon the development of personality. The development of the resources which are in men is the very essence of the civilizing process; and the chief means of accomplishing this is through education. Hence the chief business of democratic governments must be to support and promote education. But here difficulties and dangers arise. How should government support education? Should government make of education a form of political propaganda for its own maintenance, as the government of Soviet Russia has done? Should education be identified with propaganda and propaganda with education?

We shall have to discuss this question more fully when we discuss the future of education. But it is evident that if education becomes a form of political propaganda some form of autocracy will soon result—that is, it will result in a government by the governing class or party rather than in a government by the people. Safety lies only in freeing education from the danger of becoming an instrument of propaganda for any class, sect, or party. This means that the schools must be dedicated to the propagation of truth, of intelligence, and good character rather than to the propagation of the doctrines of any party, sect, or class. While the schools should be supported by the government, because the chief asset of democracy is the intelli-

gence and character of its citizens, yet they must be left free to teach what they believe to be truth. No more pernicious doctrine was ever uttered than the doctrine that the hand which writes the check has the right to dictate what shall be taught in the schools. This doctrine is equally pernicious, let us note, when applied to the Church. If the hand in the pew which writes the check for the support of the Church has the right to dictate what shall be taught from the pulpit, then liberty of preaching and of prophesying is at an end.

It is evident that a free school and a free Church are both necessary for the successful working and normal development of democratic government. But the education of the masses in a democracy is more than a matter of the functioning of the school and the Church. It extends also to the press, to public discussion, and to public assemblies. These are forms of popular education. This is the reason why democratic governments have wisely undertaken to leave the press and public discussion free within the limits of courtesy, decency, and truth. All governments have found it necessary to maintain laws to punish libel, slander, malicious misrepresentation, and incitements to crime and immorality. But further restrictions than these upon freedom of expression have been found unwise in democracies because such restrictions interfere with the free formation of a rational public opinion and

so make democracy impossible. Moreover, it has been found that the best corrective of erroneous and misleading ideas and doctrines is that publicity which freedom of discussion affords. While errors will often persist in the popular mind in spite of free discussion, yet experience has shown that there is no way of correcting a wrong idea except through the presentation of a right idea. Democratic governments rest, therefore, upon faith in the beneficence of social and political freedom and in the power of truth to prevail when given a fair field. The whole process of government in a democracy evidently proceeds much more through the education of the people by means of the schools, the Church, the press, and public discussion than through the display of coercive authority. When these institutions of popular enlightenment fail to support the truth and the right, democratic government will go under. Thus again we see that the future of democracy rests upon the general intellectual, moral, and religious culture of the masses, and that democratic governments do not, and cannot, stand alone.

If this is true, will mankind ever learn and practice the conditions of success in democratic government? Is democratic government nothing more than a counsel of perfection unrealizable under present social conditions? Are not the present experiments in democracy bound to perish?

The reply is that the nations more advanced in

culture have been slowly learning the conditions of success in democratic government, even though there is as yet no general realization of those conditions among the masses. History, being a process of experience, has taught some of the more advanced minds in every nation the need and the methods of self-government. Slowly it is being realized that government cannot be organized successfully on the war pattern, as a manifestation of the power of one party or class over another. Slowly it is being realized that government must be organized to secure justice and coöperation between all individuals, communities, and classes within the nation. Slowly it is also being realized that the war pattern will not work in the external relations of democratic nations, but that these relations must be so organized as to secure peace and justice among the nations. Gradually, too, experience is teaching us the social welfare conception of government, even though our democratic tradition is so strongly tinged with belief in a minimum government; and more and more democratic governments are concerned with the amelioration of the material conditions of life for the masses. Finally, there are even some indications in the United States and in a few of the more advanced nations of Europe that the chief concern of democratic government must be education, or the development of the human material of the nation. We hear, of course, occasion-

ally the complaint of too great expenditures in the United States for the public schools; and in the reaction following the War some States and communities seem unwilling to allow the schools freedom to teach what they believe to be the truth. But on the whole public education since the Great War has gained much more than it has lost.

We have no right, therefore, to despair as yet even of our present experiments in democracy. There are many clouds on the horizon, to be sure; but there is as yet no good reason for predicting that the whole world is soon to go through a stage of party dictatorships, similar to Fascist Italy or Soviet Russia. There is especially no reason to expect this if we are vigilant to see that our democratic governments aim at justice and peace for all, at the material well-being and spiritual development of the people. We must remember that the road to successful self-government is through experience with self-government, and not through relapses into autocracy; that men develop their institutions through trial and error; and that the very blunderings and failures of our present democratic governments may mean their development if the lessons of these failures can be learned by the masses. Democracy can be established only through trying out democracy and learning the conditions necessary for its success.

Still it must be acknowledged that democratic

government cannot stand alone, but, as we have said, depends upon the culture of the masses. If we relapse toward barbarism in our general culture even to the extent of the leading democratic nations living in constant fear of one another and becoming armed camps, undoubtedly democratic government will be succeeded by autocratic. Again, if we fail to educate the masses in the responsibilities of citizenship and the methods of democracy, we can hardly expect democratic government to win out. It is even conceivable that if dearth of leadership along social and political lines is caused by all of our ablest young men going into the business of money-getting, as our educational system seems now to send them, the democratic ship of state may founder because of lack of able pilots.

But to see clearly all of these hazards of democratic government is not to despair of the success even of our present experiments in democracy, because to see them is the first step toward their removal. Certainly we may say again that even if we fail some other nation and civilization than our own will profit by our failure, will learn the lessons taught in the hard school of experience, and will succeed where we failed. I venture to predict that democracies will be flourishing upon this planet when all the dictators of the present and the past are nothing but bad dreams.

But we would again emphasize that democratic



governments cannot stand alone. They depend upon the intelligence and character of their individual citizens, and this is equivalent to saying that they depend upon the progress of science and religion. Democratic governments will probably look more and more to the education of the masses in political science and the arts of civil government; and if they are to attain efficiency they can do so only by having a class of experts educated for the various phases of the work of the government. More and more democratic governments will have to look to science, especially to the social and political sciences, for aid in the solution of their problems.

But the crux of the problem of democracy lies in its relation to religion. We cannot deny that there have been other democratic religions than Christianity; for example, Buddhism in some Oriental countries. But modern democracies are largely an offshoot of the Christian movement. This has often been denied; but Nietzsche, who certainly cannot be accused of any friendliness to Christianity, recognized that Christianity and democracy were closely allied and indeed sprang from the same root. Nietzsche was right. Christianity, with its emphasis upon the value of the individual, inevitably led to the democratic movement with its emphasis upon the rights of the common man, though, of course, there were other contributory factors.

Now, if this is so, we may expect that the destiny

of our present democracies is bound up with that of Christianity. If Christian ideals decay among the mass of our people, and particularly among those possessed of privilege and power, we may expect democratic government will come into disfavor. Faith in democracy implies a high valuation of the individual and a faith in the possibilities of the common man. This faith is akin to Christianity, and when it disappears one of the strongest supports of democracy will be removed. Moreover, democratic governments require thought, time, and energy from the whole mass of the people, as they are essentially coöperative enterprises. They require, in other words, public spirit, or an essentially unselfish character in the leaders of the people. They require also, as we have seen, considerable social idealism in the mass of the people.

Now, there can be no question that all of these qualities are closely related in the average man to his religion. If religion does not generate in the average man altruism and social idealism, the foundations for democratic governments will be extremely uncertain. The liberty, equality, and fraternity which the democratic movement has preached imply an unselfishness and social enthusiasm which are impossible among the masses without a strong social religion.

To some this is an argument for doubting the permanency of democratic government. They say

that it is in its nature too idealistic a form of government to be permanent. Men have always been ruled by the iron hand, and they will never be ruled in any other way. Government must rest upon force, the power of one class over another. Here again we see the close connection between the faith of democracy and the faith of Christianity; for both deny that such cynicism is justified by the facts of life. But we must acknowledge that if the social ideals of Christianity are impracticable, so are those of democracy. The destiny of democratic government upon this planet, then, is inextricably bound up with the destiny of religion. Both government and religion, we are beginning to see, are phases of human culture, and so are dependent upon that transmission and enhancement of culture which we call the process of education. The fate of democracy and the fate of Christianity, therefore, are bound up with the future development of education.



CHAPTER V  
THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION





## CHAPTER V

### THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION

EDUCATION is that phase of the cultural process which concerns itself with the transmission and enhancement of culture. If the process of cultural development has been essentially a learning process, as we have every reason to believe, then culture can be transmitted from generation to generation only as the young are educated to appreciate and conserve the achievements of the past. If new additions are to be made to a given culture, they can be made only by appreciating what has already been achieved. Hence some system of education has been at the heart of every civilization which the world has known.

The immediate future of our own civilization is accordingly bound up with the system of education which we maintain. Yet such dense ignorance as to the function of education in civilization exists that education is still looked at as an individual or class matter. Even though we now have probably more interest in the promotion of education than in the development of either government or religion, still the condition of education in practically every civilized country remains unsatisfactory.

This is not difficult to understand as soon as we

know something of the history of education. Primitive peoples, such as the American Indians, had their systems of education not less than the peoples of the present; only primitive education was largely informal, brought about by direct participation in the activities of group life. To be sure, considerable stress was placed upon the young learning the customs of the group; and then, as now, considerable social pressure was put upon the young to do as their fathers before them had done. But formal education can scarcely be said to have begun until the invention of writing. Here was an esoteric, mysterious art by which the traditions of the people could be preserved, but which had to be learned by hard study. It was undoubtedly the priests of religion who first discovered and practiced the well-defined systems of writing, and hence they became the first formal teachers. Naturally, therefore, the first formal schools were schools for learning to read and write, and as they developed they developed along linguistic and literary lines; and to this day, perhaps rightly, schools have remained primarily places for linguistic and literary training.

The Greeks emancipated the school from priestly control and made the end of the school intellectual training, or the development of critical intelligence. Even though the school came again under the control of the Church in the Middle Ages, it did not lose the tradition that one of its functions was to train

the rational intelligence. Only very gradually did the schools undertake other training than linguistic, literary, intellectual, and religious. Training along artistic and scientific lines began in the schools of the Renaissance, but not until the nineteenth century did the schools begin to pay much attention to scientific and technical training. That the function of the schools should be the transmission and general development of culture along all lines was an idea which gained no practical acceptance until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and one which is still very imperfectly embodied in our educational system. Even yet the mass of our educators balk at the idea that our schools should assume the responsibility of leadership in civilization and aim to produce the fully rational and social man who can help to build a culture which embodies the true, the good, and the beautiful in the highest degree. As Everett Dean Martin has said, education is still diverted from this true aim and "made to serve ends which are irrelevant—the state, the Church, popular notions of morality, efficiency, ambition, social security."<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, we should note that during all the historical development of the school its education has been the privilege only of certain classes. In spite of advancing democracy this has remained true down to the present. It is especially so in European

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<sup>1</sup> "Whither Mankind," p. 360.

countries, but even in the United States there is little premium for brains in our public school system. The child of a poor family with exceptional intelligence has little opportunity still to-day of taking full advantage of the public school system. The children of the poor have to go to work at an early age. Hence the great mass of our children leave school before the seventh grade is finished, in spite of our boast of having made education universal. While one-third of our children enter high school, a high school education for every boy and girl that is capable of receiving it is still a program which is only on paper. Worst of all, however, the education that is received in our schools by the masses is still so fragmentary that it is hardly preparation for anything, to say nothing of intelligent citizenship or complete living. Thus the non-material phases of our culture have as yet not been appreciably advanced by our educational system. The general level of our culture still remains so low that our masses remain ignorantly unappreciative of science, art, government, religion, and even morals; or, at least, they have no intelligent appreciation of the part which these play in the general process of civilization.

Thus far, it must be admitted that education has not saved us from many of the worst evils. It did not save us from the World War; and there is little basis for supposing that education has prepared the

mass of the people as yet in any country for the intelligent handling of the great problems of our human world. On account of its non-selective and materialistic character our education has not even trained leaders to handle such problems.

Altogether, then, if judged from the standpoint of its leadership in culture, our educational system must be rated low. What its immediate future development will be there are few certain signs to indicate. For some years past the trend in our education has undoubtedly been materialistic. Science has been exalted, to be sure, but science has been confused with physical science; and even then what has been taught has been not so much the spirit of science as the results of science as a basis for vocational and economic success. Materialistic interests have so invaded our high schools and dominated our universities that even some of our more thoughtful business men have at times voiced a protest. The practical is emphasized until the higher cultural interests are almost lost sight of. Real scholarship under such circumstances, even in the universities, is often at a discount, and economic success is the thing uppermost in the minds of the most ambitious students. There is surely some ground for the criticism of our European friends that such education produces skill in techniques, but no true culture. Certainly very few of our university students absorb much of our higher culture.



But even where the older cultural traditions remain in our education it is often a mere worship of the past—of its art, its literature, its religion, and even its government and morals—which furnishes no adequate stimulus to surpass the achievements of the past. Such education, which finds in the past all worth-while patterns of action, not only becomes unduly conservative, but frequently reactionary. It has often been denied that the too exclusive study of the Greek and Latin classics has any tendency to perpetuate or reinstate Greek and Latin standards in our political, social, and moral life. But it would be strange if it did not. The condition of Europe to-day, as we have seen, cannot be understood except as we take into account the continued imitation of Roman patterns, and this continued imitation of Rome seems to be connected with the system of European education. At any rate the matter would bear investigation.

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To be sure, knowledge of past achievements is the foundation of all culture, and so of all education. We cannot understand the present, to say nothing of the future, except as we understand the past. The young should be taught to appreciate and preserve all that is of value in the achievements of the past. But our education should not approach the past on its hands and knees. It should study the past to see, if possible, how its achievements may not only be preserved, but surpassed, since all the



human past, we now know, represents a relatively incomplete, yes, a relatively barbarous stage of development. This is particularly true of past social conditions. There is, therefore, no excuse for ancestor worship in our system of education. Even the Constitution of the United States, if we are to study it in our schools, should not be studied as a perfect document, but as a product of the political culture of its time, and therefore susceptible of improvement, even though we may still be far from living up to the ideals implied in its spirit. There is no safety in a static or conservative education. There is only stagnation and the death of the human spirit.

But the question may well be raised whether the education of the schools can be anything else than conservative. Many educators, as we have seen, resent the idea that the schools should have a large responsibility for the leadership of civilization. They say that the schools have all that they can do in transmitting the heritage of the past, without attempting to build the future; that the most that the schools can do is to adjust to our present civilization and our present society; that the schools are controlled by the *mores* of their time and place, and that they cannot escape from this control even if they would. Hence the idea of looking to the school for leadership is a mistake. This question, of course, involves the question of the freedom of the schools,

which we have already discussed under the problem of the future of government; but now the question is broader and involves the whole relation of the schools to the community. Should the school be also freed from the tyranny of custom and community dictation? The reply is that if the school aims at the liberation of the mind it must be free from the dictation of the community and of custom not less than of political government. The school in its teaching can acknowledge no authority but that of the truth. It can, therefore, be as easily forward-looking as conservative. Indeed, in following the truth it will be both.

*School*  
*conservative*  
*forward looking*

It may, of course, be said that the schools have no choice, that the *mores* of the community and the corresponding economic conditions will dominate the schools in any event. The school is the mere reflex of the industrial and economic system and has no choice but to serve it or go out of business. But truth does not vary with economic systems, and those bodies of tested knowledge which we term the sciences, to say nothing of the legacies of art, literature, and religion, bequeathed by the past, remain the same under all systems of industry and morals. The theory of organic evolution and its supporting facts, for example, does not vary with the *mores* or economic conditions. But the question is, will the schools of the future be at liberty to teach this theory or any other which they believe

to be true? Will the schools be free to follow truth? The reply is that if they are not free, men will seek some other instrument of free thinking and investigation; for men require truth as well as bread to live. If official public education is not free, then men will seek the truth in some other form of education, perhaps the agitator on the street corner.

Education can, of course, be a slave of the *mores* and be conservative and reactionary. It has often been so in human history. On the other hand, education can easily be progressive, and will inevitably be so if it frees the mind and follows truth. It does not need to be the slave of the *mores*. Indeed, so far as we know, the *mores* can only be changed by education; if not the education of the school, then the education of the Church, the press, or public discussion. We shall not get rid of warlike *mores*, for example, by treaties or leagues of nations, important as they may be; but only through some method of educating the people. It has been a mistake of the American people in particular to think that the *mores* can be changed by the action of law and government, whereas the most that law can do is to confirm and sustain the change. The real change must be in the attitudes of the people, and that can be brought about only through some form of education. If the school of the future does not wish to lose its educational position and leadership, it must assume its share of responsibility in the

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leadership of civilization. It must undertake the work of building a new and better world and no longer be the slave of the customs and traditions of the hour.

But if the education of the future escapes from the dangers of materialism and ultraconservatism, it may still fall into the bondage of fads and fashions, of special interests and narrow factions, and become one-sided. This is particularly the danger of the education of the hour. There is, for example, the fad that we learn only by doing, that the schools should devote themselves to practical training and primarily to the education of the hand, although we know that language is the vehicle of all culture and that men learn the most difficult social adjustments, not by doing, but through their imagination. "Give a psychologist," says Everett Dean Martin, "a rat and a graph, and you will get about the last word on the subject of the philosophy of education in this machine age."<sup>2</sup> The psychologist forgets that rats have no culture and are not men. This fad, of course, plays into the hands of vocational education, which is more and more becoming the popular form of education, both because business interests wish it and because it promises a white-collar job. Efficiency is demanded of our school graduates, but what is usually meant is efficiency in some technique.

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<sup>2</sup>"Whither Mankind," p. 374.

Social intelligence and character are pushed into the background.

If these latter are thought of, it is usually in terms of patriotic service or sentiment. The danger here is the confusion of patriotism with the support of an existing government or some particular national policy. If patriotism is taught in our schools, it must be taught critically, or education will foment rather than allay political passions and prejudices. Factions and parties will always be only too ready to make use of uncritical patriotic instruction for their own purposes. Oligarchies and autocracies have always sought to maintain their power, as they do in Russia and in Italy at this moment, through education which is professedly patriotic. Nationalism, that dread specter which haunts the peace of Europe, has fattened for over a generation on this sort of education. And with nationalism has come militarism and the whole brood of pagan political ideas. Every abuse of political power in the world can easily hide behind patriotism, and therefore in education, as in life, patriotism is not enough. The open-minded love of truth and right should have precedence over the support of any political and social order.

Here we come to the whole question of the relation of propaganda to education. Prof. John Dewey has recently startled the educational world by telling us upon his return from a study of the Russian school

*Russia* system that in Russia "propaganda is education and education is propaganda."<sup>3</sup> One is tempted, of course, to brush this statement aside with the mere remark that nothing better can be expected of Soviet Russia. But we shall make a great mistake if we refuse to consider an idea because it comes from Soviet Russia. The fact is that historically school education has always been bound up closely with propaganda, if we define propaganda as an effort to get people to accept certain definite beliefs, such as religious, moral, political, or economic. Even when education has aimed at teaching people merely how to think, rather than what to believe, it has nevertheless been a propaganda for the open-minded love of truth, for the scientific spirit, and even the results of science. Indeed, we might as well acknowledge that school education in transmitting to us the heritage of the past has always been practically and necessarily a propaganda for much more than that. If it did not fall into ancestor worship or into a worship of Greece and Rome, or England and America, the school was indeed remarkable. We now know also that a liberalizing education cannot be given independent of content, and that any education which aspires to be of cultural value should not be so given. It is well, therefore, that the challenge of Soviet education has been thrown down to the educational world.

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<sup>3</sup>The *New Republic*, November 28, 1928, p. 41.



Admitting that all education is necessarily a propaganda for something, the question still remains what sort of propaganda should be permitted and encouraged in our public schools. We would doubtless agree that the propaganda which we now find in the Russian schools for a "rigid and dogmatic Marxism" is as destructive of liberalizing education as anything could well be. It is destructive of the whole principle of the freedom of the school which we have just stated and defended. Even propaganda for patriotism in our schools is apt to degenerate into a propaganda for nationalism or for the support of particular acts of government. If education is to be propaganda, therefore, it should be propaganda for those broad principles which underlie all successful human living, all development of culture, all human progress, such as the love of truth and right, of justice and fair play, of freedom of thinking, investigation, and discussion, of the welfare of humanity and of each human group as a part of humanity. If it be said that propaganda for such beliefs would be very vague, the reply is that there is its safety. It is nevertheless these very ideals which have inspired men to the greatest achievements. All experience has shown that there is no narrowing effect in propaganda for these universal human values, and that an education which fails to teach these divorces itself from the real life of men.

mb' → But it may be asked, should not school education, conscious of its function in cultural development, be a propaganda for culture itself? The reply is, "Certainly, but not for a particular culture." And the same reply must be given for each necessary phase of culture—for art, for science, for government, for morality, for religion. Education should be a propaganda for the development of all these phases of culture as embodying necessary social values; but it dare not be a propaganda for any particular form of these without danger of fettering the human spirit. Here, of course, we run up against an active and noisy opposition. The atheist declares that religion is not a necessary phase of culture, the anarchist says the same thing about government, and the immoralist the same about morality. The reply is that education must here be guided by human science and that its attitude is not dogmatic. The scientific study of mankind has discovered no civilization, and especially no developed civilization, without religion, moral codes, and government, any more than it has discovered peoples without language, art, or tested knowledge. A propaganda in education to perfect these instrumentalities of culture is in no way different from a propaganda to perfect language, art, or science. Education dares not dispense with such propaganda, because upon achievements in these lines, so far as we know, depends the development of all culture.

But should not our education be a propaganda for the forms of government and religion which we have achieved—for example, Christianity and democracy? The reply is that here again the public school, at least, must be guided by the scientific spirit. Even a democracy cannot afford to make its schools instruments of a partisan propaganda for democratic government. They should, of course, study the mechanism of democratic government to understand it; but the higher schools at least should study side by side with democratic government the Soviet, Fascist, and other autocratic systems, letting the truth be manifest in regard to all systems. The same position must be taken by Christian nations regarding Christianity. If Christianity is of value, we need not fear that it will suffer from impartial study and comparison with other religions. The best propaganda for both Christianity and democracy in the long run is to maintain free thinking and free discussion in the schools with the object of discovering the truth in these matters. It is, of course, the same with all other propagandas which claim the support of the schools, such as the propaganda for public health. Propaganda which does not invite the free inquiry and investigation required by the scientific spirit has no place in the schools; for in one sense the schools should not be places for propaganda at all, not even for patriotism or public health, but places for the discovery of the values of

life, of which truth, and goodness, and beauty are central. Any propaganda that asks for more than a fair field and no favors must be looked on with suspicion. The school should exist not to teach orthodoxies in belief, scientific, political, or religious, but to assist in the development of culture and in the building of our human world. Its guide in all things should be the scientific spirit, interpreted as the open-minded love of truth, if we may assume that the truth is that by which men may be freed from errors of every sort and, therefore, that by which they must ultimately live.

The function of education, it must now be plain, is nothing less than the building of our human world. If the development of culture is through the process of learning, then education is the method of controlling this process. As Ward proclaimed, it should be directed toward collective telesis. The very fact that education plays such a key part in all future social development shows us, however, that our social progress is not inevitable and automatic. What sort of progress we shall be able to show in the immediate future largely, if not wholly, depends upon the sort of education given to the mass of the people. If it is an education which looks backward, then little progress can be expected. If it is an education that studies and stresses chiefly the material side of culture, then only an ill-balanced civilization can result. If narrow and partisan prop-

aganda dominates our schools, our churches, and our public press, then seeds of error and dissension are liable to be sown which are almost certain to result in future social conflicts and social instability. No doubt, through experience, if in no other way, some people somewhere will learn some time that the schools and other educational agencies are not for partisanship or the promotion of special interests; that their work is the production of a balanced civilization, of a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence, and of corresponding individual intelligence and character. But whether we have learned this and whether our schools are moving in this direction may easily be doubted.

If we continue to progress, then we must discover that the next step is the humanizing and socializing of education, just as in science the next step is the development of the human and social sciences. For in the building of our human world the fundamental adjustments to be made are those of individuals and groups to one another, even more than adjustments of individuals to physical nature. Gradually this truth is becoming evident; for we are now beginning to see that our boasted conquest of physical nature will avail us little if we cannot harmonize human relations. The education of the future must be a socialized education if we wish even stability in our civilization, to say nothing of progress.

But few of our educators seem to understand all



that is implied in a socialized education. At first socialized education was confused with vocational education. But it is now generally recognized that vocational training is at most only a phase of a socialized education; that a socialized education aims primarily not at producing efficient engineers, physicians, lawyers, or teachers, but intelligent citizens. But the words "citizens" and "citizenship" may be interpreted in too narrowly a political way; whereas, of course, the fully social man, the man who can function intelligently and helpfully in every social group of which he is a part from the family to humanity, is the aim and object of socialized education. It aims, as we have already said, to produce the fully rational and social man who can help to build a culture which embodies in the highest degree the true, the good, and the beautiful. Such an education, besides the special training for a socially useful occupation or vocation which should complete it, involves at least three other fundamental objectives.

*Mind* The first of these is the freeing and the training of the mind of the individual. The mind is the chief organ of adaptation in man, and unless it is free and trained to do well its work that work cannot be done. This may be said to be the Greek ideal of education, and the future cannot afford to forget it. If the intelligence of man is that on which we must rely in culture building, then we should free it not



only from ignorance and superstition, but from mere traditionalism and group prejudices. Only thus can we build a civilization that is not custom-bound and not controlled by narrow special interests. If we wish a human world that is plastic, adaptable, and progressive—and no other human world is safe to live in—then we must have an education which is liberalizing and liberating of the human mind. Language will always have a fundamental place in such education, not only because language is the vehicle of all culture, but because language is the key which unlocks to us the mental life of peoples. The proper study of foreign language is, therefore, liberalizing and should help to fit us for world citizenship. So, too, the study of mathematics and the physical sciences is a necessary part of a liberal education, because nothing frees the mind more than a knowledge of our physical universe, including, of course, the physical evolution of the forms of life. Possibly, of course, even more emancipatory is the critical study of the customs and institutions of different peoples and ages; but this brings us to the second fundamental objective of a socialized education.

This second objective is the imparting of definite social information and getting the student acquainted with our human world. One great source of the difficulties of the present is that every little group in our world is generally ignorant of how every

other group lives. This ignorance leads to isolation, suspicion, misunderstandings, and hatred. Such social ignorance is as dangerous as dynamite in our complex civilization and must be replaced by knowledge of our human world. We now see that the old educational dogma of the nineteenth century, that education can be given regardless of content, is about as dangerous a doctrine as our schools have ever sponsored. For we are now seeing that social ignorance is the most dangerous and costly of all forms of ignorance; and future education will rightly be directed to the overcoming of this ignorance. We cannot live rightly in our complex world without a great deal of social intelligence, and we cannot have social intelligence without information about other groups than our own and the conditions under which they live. The urban dweller, for example, cannot be just to the farmer if he does not know something about the conditions under which the farmer lives. The white man cannot be just to the colored man if he knows little or nothing of the conditions under which the colored man lives.

*Curriculum* But all this imparting of social information, as a basis for social intelligence, goes back to the question of the curriculum in our schools. A socialized education means that the studies—history, anthropology, sociology, politics, economics, and ethics—shall be given the central place in the curriculum of our schools, flanked on the one side by language, on the

other by the natural sciences. The social studies represent the problems with which the citizen must deal; and the citizen in our free societies is more and more called upon to help solve these problems. If democracy is not to be the rule of ignorance, we must educate the sovereigns of democracy—that is, the mass of the people. This does not mean that the mass of the people are to be fitted to solve themselves difficult problems of politics, economics, and social organization. That would doubtless be absurd. But it does mean that they should have sufficient social and political education to be able to appreciate the expert in these lines and to be able to discriminate the expert from the demagogue. This is especially important in a democracy.

This means that our educational system should provide for the education of social and political leaders not less than of leaders in the material arts of life. It is not simply democratic government that is threatened with failure through the woeful social and political ignorance of our masses, but practically every group and every institution. Our family life, for example, is threatened by our social ignorance. Our economic life abounds with examples of such ignorance. The Church is menaced by the same ignorance. Religion has a practical stake in social education, not only because social education is closely akin to religious and moral education, but because our whole civilization is suffering from lack

of competent spiritual leadership, leadership along nonmaterial lines. The lack of an adequate number of trained social leaders along nonmaterial lines is at the bottom of many of our social perplexities. The education of leaders should be the special work of our higher institutions of learning; and if they fail in the future to produce the spiritual leaders needed by our civilization, we cannot reasonably expect that it can meet the crises which growing numbers, conflicting interests, and increasing complexity of life will inevitably bring. But there is little use to train leaders for a democratic world if we leave the masses socially ignorant. The problem of the education of the future will be not how to produce great men, but great societies, which will respond to intelligent leadership. How can social education accomplish this?

*Imagination  
and all  
Culture* Imagination is the basis of all culture—of religion, art, science, and even of good citizenship. Unless we can imagine our fellow human beings, and the conditions under which they live, we cannot possibly adjust ourselves to them. This is the psychological basis for giving students in our schools fundamental information concerning our human world. The education of the future should concern itself with developing social imagination in the young if it wishes them to be able to adjust themselves to our complex world and to carry forward civilization. It should teach the young to identify themselves in

their imagination with all men everywhere. I venture to predict that the education of the future will teach the young even that they are educated just in proportion as they can, through their imaginations, identify themselves with the life of all humanity; that their social imagination is the gateway not only to good citizenship, but to all the higher culture. While more is concerned in the development of an efficient social imagination than mere knowledge, social knowledge or information is the material with which it works. Whether we agree or not with the late Prof. Lester F. Ward that the wide diffusion of social information will lead spontaneously to progressive social action, we must admit that right social information is necessary for right social action, and so for true progress. This is one way in which education may produce great societies.

But socialized education will not stop with the giving of mere information about our human world. It will inculcate correct social values. This is its third task and the heart of the matter. After all, the whole task of education, as we have said, is to help the individual to discover the true values of life; and so the task of social education is to help him to discover true social values. This is why educators should object to a social science which divorces itself from all social values. If the scientific spirit is to guide our schools, it must be the scientific

spirit in the sense of the open-minded love of truth and not the scientific spirit in the sense of weighing and measuring. The open-minded love of truth compels us to see not only that there are social values, but that some have an adequate foundation in the facts of life, and that others are merely traditional, have no such foundation in facts, and have probably been built upon erroneous observations or apprehensions. When we study thoroughly, for example, the use of narcotics in human society, we are in position to see what a reasonable social standard regarding their use should be, despite the fact that the actual social standard may be very different. This illustration is sufficient to show that our value-judgments are, and should be, closely correlated with our fact-judgments. The social education of the future will recognize this and build upon the social sciences a social ethics; or rather the approach of education to social ethics will be through the social sciences.

If it be said that ordinary school education can take no account of social values because the school has no instrument to distinguish between rival systems of ethics and to decide which is correct and which incorrect, the reply is that it is the duty of the school to present all systems, just as it is to present all systems of government, and that, just as the examination of social facts and principles will serve to evaluate the different systems of govern-



ment, so the study of social facts will serve to evaluate the various systems of morals. The inadequacy of power or pleasure as a standard of right may not be evident, for example, from the facts of human psychology; but it becomes almost immediately evident when we examine social facts. The inadequacies of service as a standard also become clearly evident if the service is to a narrow group, such as an economic class or a nation. The study of social facts shows clearly enough that the development of all humanity must be the basis of the standard of social values; and that, if this is so, the service of all humanity is the practical standard of right for the individual. In many other ways also, of course, the value of altruism, of public spirit, of the service of mankind can easily be taught in all our schools. In fact, it is just as easy to teach moral excellence in our schools, if we make up our minds to do so, as it is to teach vocational skill. The main impediment is that our culture outside of the schools is still relatively nonmoral, and that we still have the educational tradition that moral instruction should be dogmatic, preceptual, and based upon definite philosophical and religious beliefs. All educational science, however, has shown that instruction in morals, like any other form of practical education, must be through the facts of life. When we approach moral education through the door of the social sciences, we find that we have an experimental and

factual basis for it; that it is not insuperable or dangerous, and that it need not be more dogmatic than other forms of practical education. The education of the future will probably recognize this and make social education the approach to moral education in our schools. However, the education of the future will also probably recognize that the public school is not the best place for moral education; that the home and the Church are also fundamental institutions peculiarly fitted to give moral education to the young, and that a wise public policy will work for the strengthening and upbuilding of these institutions rather than to unload everything upon the school.

One reason why the public school is inadequate as an agency of moral education is that it fails to touch the emotions of the young in the way that the home and the Church can readily do. Perhaps the school is needlessly deficient here, and that it might do much more than it does for the proper education of the emotions. We must always remember that, in education, "instruction does much, but inspiration does everything." This educational specialists sometimes forget. Certainly the conception of the work of the school as concerned only with the education of the critical intelligence belongs to ages gone by. We now see that the school as an agency for the transmission and enhancement of culture is concerned with all of life, and that it dare not neglect

the education of the emotions so far as it is able successfully to undertake it. This has been implied in what has been said about education as a process of discovering the values of life. The relative values which the school inculcates, whether they be truth, beauty, goodness, public spirit, or the service of mankind, will hardly be sensed as values by the students unless they are given an emotional setting. The education of the future will say that a school which does not arouse some enthusiasm for these fundamental values of civilization is hardly worthy of the name. The school of the future undoubtedly should pay more attention to the education of the emotions, and particularly of the nobler emotions, as these emotions are quite as important in the transmission and safeguarding of culture as is the critical intelligence. It is just at this point that our schools have probably made their biggest failure. But the social studies show the way out. Nothing so stirs emotion as the deeds and lives of men, the fate and destiny of communities, nations, and civilizations. The social studies, in other words, not only train the imagination, but awaken emotion. There is the chance of the teacher to awaken and train the sympathetic emotions in his students, the emotions which furnish a basis for altruistic actions, public spirit, and human service. The student, indeed, cannot be taught to identify himself in imagination with all humanity unless sympathy is awakened.

A sympathetic imagination is a socially efficient imagination. It is also the moral imagination. The final task of social education, therefore, is the education, the socialization, of the emotions. And this is still another way in which it may produce great societies.

It is hardly necessary to say that an education which socializes the intelligence and character, the emotions and values, of individuals is not far from a religious education. "The higher social culture," Professor Cooley rightly informs us, "is of a kindred spirit with religion"; and Professor Whitehead tells us that all education that awakens and elevates the soul of man is essentially religious. Surely an education that fails to awaken the higher powers of the mind is far from efficient. A socialized education, as we have seen, should generate in some degree an "enthusiasm for humanity," which was the distinctive quality, according to Prof. J. R. Seeley, of Christ. An education into the appreciation of human values and of human service is therefore in the broad sense religious; and in this sense the public schools do not need to be "Godless institutions."

Nevertheless, many educators as well as religious workers feel that our schools should do more than this for religious education. The public schools, however, for reasons which we have seen, cannot give denominational religious instruction and preserve their scientific impartiality. Indeed, it is just

the demand that religious instruction be denominational or sectarian which has hitherto excluded religious education from our public schools. Admitting to the full the value of religious education, with our separation of Church and state, the public school has no way out except through the study of religion as a phase of culture in the same scientific spirit that any other phase of culture is studied. I think that the future will recognize that such scientific study of religions, just like the scientific study of governments, has great educational value. Such study will show how the quality of a civilization depends upon the quality of the religion prevailing and will give the student a background of facts by which he can evaluate for himself the various religions. The student will discover also that all positive religions emphasize certain beliefs which are social values infinitely precious to mankind, such as the belief in the reality of the spiritual, the faith in its ultimate triumph over brute forces, the kinship of man and the universe, the faith in the possibilities of human life and in the power of man to come into touch with and receive help from the divine. These lay a foundation, to be sure, for the development of the religious life; but here we shall discover that the relation of the public school to religious education is necessarily like that of government to morality. Just as government cannot enforce the maximum of morality, but only the

minimum which the community will tolerate, so the public school cannot impart the maximum of religious education, but only the minimum which the community demands. But we need the maximum of religious education, hence the need of the Church and the Church school in addition to the public school. Those who believe in religious education, as I do, should seek not to put one more burden upon the public school, but to develop the Church as an educational institution to the maximum of its efficiency.

Here, then, we see that the state should seek no monopoly of the education of the young. Such monopoly is especially inconsistent with the principle of true democracy, which, as we have already pointed out, will give liberty to minorities, so far as it is not inconsistent with the general welfare. The tolerant spirit of democracy will welcome the competition of private schools and universities. Such competition is, indeed, necessary for freedom in education. The public school will no more fear such competition than it will fear the work of the Church, the public press, and the public assembly as educational institutions. The school is not the only educational institution of society, and our complex culture requires for the proper education of the masses the coöperation of all available agencies. Properly equipped private schools of every sort should, therefore, be encouraged in a society which



values the freedom of the school. This is, of course, not saying that the State should not set minimum standards of efficiency and scholarship for private schools, especially where they duplicate the work of the public schools, but it is saying that certain phases of education can probably best be carried out in private institutions, and that religious education is one of these. We shall return to this problem, then, when we take up the future of religion.

Universal education of all the people is probably the best test of high civilization, just as universal illiteracy is the sure mark that even the lower rungs of civilization in the strict sense have not been reached. No nation has as yet, however, even reached the stage of the perfect universal literacy of its adult citizens. It seems idle under such circumstances to ask whether such an ideal system of education for the masses as we have sketched is realizable in the near future. No nation that even pretends to high civilization dares longer to leave its citizens uneducated. Probably in the near future no such nation will dare leave its citizens without a minimum of the social and political education which we have sketched. The problem of crime and the demoralization of the home make it equally imperative that moral education no longer be neglected by our public schools. Not only dare the

nations no longer leave the masses of their citizens brutal and uneducated, but they must strive to educate them for a higher social culture.

There are many signs, of course, that the leading nations are awakening to the urgent need of better schools and better education for the masses. But as yet only a few communities, and no nations, have recognized that the chief cost of government should be the support of the public school system. Our schools still remain lost in materialism, their revenues being devoted chiefly to physical science and vocational training. Adequate social, political, and moral education for all the pupils of our schools still remains largely a program on paper. The schools still remain inadequate as socially selective agencies, especially for the selection and training of sound scholarship and of capable leadership. Education is too much of a fad and a fashion and is not taken enough as the most serious business of life. Finally, it is prostituted still to all sorts of partisan, personal, and commercial ends. For all these reasons and many more the fully rational and social man which our educational system should produce is not yet much in evidence.

But history is an accumulation of experience, and it is possible that we may learn from this experience, or if not we, then some other people, just the sort of

education which is needed for the safeguarding and enhancement of culture. But we shall learn also the limitations of the education of the school in the building of civilization. Something more is needed for the production of the highest moral culture, and that something more is—religion.

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CHAPTER VI  
THE FUTURE OF RELIGION





## CHAPTER VI

### THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

RELIGION is that phase of culture which is concerned with the highest personal and social values. It is a valuing attitude toward life and toward the universe. When it is positive, rather than negative, it is faith in the universe and in the possibilities of life. It is then, as has been well said, a sort of cosmic optimism. While a product of man's imagination and reasoning, it is primarily an emotional, a valuing attitude. All culture is a matter of value, but religion is the effort of society to order and, so to speak, evaluate those values. It concerns the supreme, the ultimate values. It strives to get values of life and of death, of the known and the unknown, which shall harmonize with man's aspirations and wishes. This is what we meant when we said that religion concerned the highest social values.

Unlike science and philosophy, the end of religion is not in man's ideas, but in his will and emotions. It seeks to harmonize man on the side of will and emotion with his world. The individual finds in religion a means to harmonize himself with the larger life of which he is a part—that is, with the universe and with the community of men—because it gives meaning and value to life. The group finds in religion a

means of control over the individual—a means of securing the dedication of individual life to social ends. Religion controls through participation in the ideal values of group life. It is thus a means of adjustment used by human beings in establishing harmonious relations with their fellow beings, on the one hand, and with the mysterious powers of universe, on the other.

Religion, then, is not merely a psychological experience of the individual, but it is also a phase of culture. It becomes an experience of the individual just because it is a phase of culture. It may become an especially vivid part of the individual's experience because it presents itself as a summation of all values and as a supreme control over life. Like philosophy, science, and art, however, religion is not susceptible of adequate explanation through individual psychology, but only through the history of culture. Like education, religion always has its personal as well as its social side; and like education, also, religion functions as a control over personal and group culture. But religion, at the same time, in its highly developed forms, is perhaps the most intimate and personal form of culture, because in it all the hopes, fears, loves, and aspirations of the individual soul are centered.

Religion is thus a many-sided cultural phenomenon. It is the vaguest element in culture, because it is concerned primarily with subjective attitudes,

though it is probably also the most vital element in culture, because it concerns the supreme values of life. It is not surprising, therefore, that just as there are minds which fail to see the cultural utility of science or government, so there are those who fail to see the cultural utility of religion. They say that religion is either a set of wishful conclusions of man regarding life and the universe, or it is the survival of primitive magical practices used by man for adjustment before he had scientific knowledge, or both; that it once probably served a useful function, but that it hardly can in a mature, scientific world; and that in the future religion will gradually disappear.

This judgment of religion at first seems plausible. For it is undoubtedly true that religious faith is bound up with the aspirations and wishes of men; and it is also true that in its origins religion was intimately connected with primitive magic, and that even the most developed religions to-day still show traces of that connection. But admitting these facts does not show what religion is to-day or what its function is in our present culture. Let us remember that any element of culture should be judged not by its primitive origin, but by its present condition and possible development. Organized government, we may recall, probably originated in military needs; and therefore the anarchists argue that it should disappear with the disappearance of war and crime. Moral codes originated in social customs; and there-

fore the immoralist says that morality is only a social convention and that moral codes will disappear with the growth of intelligence.

But such arguments do not hold good. Organized government will not cease to be needed when society has attained to peace, nor will moral codes be out of date when society becomes intelligent. On the contrary, the great constructive work of government can hardly be carried through, as we have seen, until peace is established in our world; nor will moral codes be able to accomplish much beneficent work until men are intelligent. There is good ground for believing that with the growing complexity of our human world the work of government and morality will not cease to be needed when society becomes scientific and intelligent. On the contrary, there is ground for believing that with growing complexity of life their work will be more needed, and that in a scientific and intelligent world they can work more efficiently for the good of man than in an ignorant and half-intelligent one.

No easy utopia confronts human society in the future with increasing population and decreasing support by uncontrolled nature. Whatever improvements man achieves in his collective lot will be, as we have already seen, not only by the cultivation of intelligence, but also by the cultivation of the nobler emotions; not only by the control of nature, but also by the maintenance of social morale

and the control of human nature. Elsewhere I have said: "Man will never cease to need a positive, constructive, trustful attitude toward the universe and the whole system of things. He must have confidence in his world, if he is not to despair. He must believe in the possibilities and the value of life if his energies are to be fully released—if he is to function efficiently as a member of society, to the point, perhaps, of complete self-sacrifice. He must be able, in other words, to confront the issues of life and death with a supreme faith; but to do this he must project his social and personal values into the universal reality itself. . . . Crises in life will not cease through human progress, nor will man come to need less the power of self-sacrifice. The world will never cease to need, in other words, clean, high-minded, self-devoted, self-sacrificing human living. The 'soft' view of life has proved itself to be an unworkable view. The hedonistic utopia of a 'pleasure economy' in which no one would have to work harder, or behave better, than he wanted to is seen to be a chimera. Men will always need for efficient, worth-while human living full command of their adaptive powers; and highest among these, standing side by side, yet often in these later days made strangely to antagonize each other, are religion and reason."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"The Reconstruction of Religion," pp. 26, 27, 38.

The problem of life, in other words, so far as we can see, will always remain for the great mass of human beings a hard problem. Men everywhere, not less in the future than in the past, will always have to confront their world with hope and courage and faith, and with loyalty, good will, and devotion to their fellows, if human life is to be lived together successfully. Religion, by universalizing these values, gives a fuller meaning to life, encourages hope, strengthens endurance in suffering, intensifies loyalty to ideals, prevents pessimism, despair, and degeneracy. Thus it increases stability of character in the individual, which in turn makes for harmonious as well as stable relations among individuals. There is, therefore, an intimate connection between the higher phases of religion and social and personal idealism. Just as genius cannot flourish in an atmosphere of materialism, neither can social idealism.

The absurdity of describing religion merely as "a defense mechanism" or as "a rationalization" of our wishes must now be manifest. No doubt there is much religion of that character. But at its best religion is devotion to life's highest values. While fear may have had a large part to play in the lower forms of religion, it is love and gratitude to humanity and to God that play the leading part in its higher forms; and just as all unselfish love releases energy, inspires service and self-sacrifice, and exalts the soul, so does true religion. It is a control over the moods



of men and over their conduct which brings individual character and social culture to its finest fruition.

The absurdity of thinking that in the future either science or philosophy will replace religion must now also be manifest. The dependence of intelligent religion upon science and philosophy may be freely acknowledged. But science is tested knowledge, while religion is in the realm of faith, a valuing attitude. The relation of philosophy to religion is closer; but even philosophy is a series of intellectual judgments and does not concern itself with the control of the emotions and moods of men. The dependence of science and philosophy upon religion, on the other hand, is often overlooked. Both science and philosophy are searches for the truth; but if the love of truth has not been inculcated by religion and morals, it is doubtful whether truth will be accepted when found, or even be sought, when it is opposed to the self-interest of groups or individuals. The scientific spirit is, then, a part of religion; and when ethical religion loses its hold upon men we can scarcely expect that the devotion to truth will remain. It is too commonly assumed that the truth will be perceived and accepted by the human mind simply through its presentation; but the history of knowledge shows that nothing is commoner than the rejection of demonstrated truth by the prejudiced mind and, on the other hand, that a right atti-

tude is nearly always halfway to the solution of any problem. If religion should cease to throw its weight upon the side of intellectual honesty, the open-minded love of truth, and the service of humanity through the discovery of truth, it is safe to say that the springs of scientific inquiry would dry up within three or four generations. Developed science and developed religion are not independent, but interdependent, as phases of one common culture.

That humanistic science can be of the greatest use to religion the future will surely perceive, especially if our conception of science be broadened to include all tested knowledge; for the root of both science and religion is human experience. Science has tended to take for its field man's experiences with the external world, while religion has tended to take for its field the world of inner experiences, especially man's moral and social experiences. But this field of inner experience has now also been invaded by science, and tested knowledge within this area should be of the greatest aid in the development of religion. For tested knowledge will give us the facts and laws of man's moral and social experiences. Prophetic religion has always based itself largely upon this phase of experience. More and more all religion is becoming an interpretation of man's moral experiences; more and more the authority to which we appeal in religion is not mere tradition, or

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the doctrine of some Church, but the moral experience of mankind.

But when religion turns to experience as its authority it is, in effect, turning to science, unless we narrow science unduly in some dogmatic manner. It is sheer prejudice, therefore, which prompts a recent writer to say: "Religion and science are mutually exclusive terms. No union between them is possible. No clever arguments formulated either in the camp of religion or in that of science can effect their union. . . . To proclaim the marriage of science and religion is either blasphemy or nonsense. Science . . . has broken down the ramparts and stormed the city of God."<sup>2</sup> This quotation shows clearly the damage that has been done by too narrow a conception of science, on the one hand, and of religion, on the other. Of course, there can be no union, nor even coöperation, between a science which is a mere tracing of mechanical cause and effect and a religion which explains human experience in terms of supernatural agents. But if the future can free itself from both the scientific and the religious dogmatist, the coöperation of the human sciences and religion is inevitable. For both spring, we repeat, from human experience. Both seek to serve man. The knowledge which science represents will, when it includes the moral experience of mankind,

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<sup>2</sup>Wallace, "The Scientific World View," pp. 4, 5.

be found an aid to a religion which finds its chief authority in that same experience. Knowledge and faith, let us remember, are not mutually exclusive terms, but are working partners in the process of successful living.

I have just spoken of experience as the basis of religion and of moral experience as its special basis. But I would not be misunderstood. The experience upon which religion is based is as wide as life itself.<sup>3</sup> It is the summation of all our values, the vision of all things in the light of eternity. But the heart and core of religion is moral experience; for if we take out of religion the elements of moral struggle and redemption, we would have little left which could survive scientific criticism. To divorce religion and ethics would be fatal to both. But in man's moral experiences as he confronts life and the universe, on the one hand, and the community of his fellow men, on the other, we have the inexhaustible source of man's higher spiritual, and so of his religious, life. There can be no danger, therefore, of religion disappearing. The only problem is, what kind of religion shall we have? Shall we have a rational religion, or an irrational one? Shall we soon learn that religion may be more securely grounded upon the moral experiences of mankind than upon tradition

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<sup>3</sup>Professor Wieman, in his "Religious Experience and Scientific Method," seems to argue that there is a specific religious experience, but this would seem to be doubtful.

and authority? It would seem certain that with the decay of external authority and traditionalism in our civilization we must base religion upon experience, if we wish it to strike deep roots into the lives of men. Religion concerns itself with the highest personal and social values, and these values are not intangible or outside of experience. They are real, and they are discoverable. Religion can be taught, therefore, to the awakened soul *as experience*, and it will be the more real, and so the stronger, when it is so taught.

All that has been said thus far, however, is but preliminary to coming to grips with the real problem of religion; and that problem lies in the nature of the universe and of the human soul. If the universe is a mere mechanism, a mere whirlpool of physical energy; if the spiritual or nonmaterial has no reality or power, then religion has no reality and no place in rational culture except as illusion. "Religion," rightly says Professor Whitehead, "is the reaction of human nature to its search for God"; and if there be no corresponding reality, then the search and all its results are vain. Though Auguste Comte was an agnostic, and by many would be ranked as a materialist, in his philosophy, yet he had the good sense to acknowledge that every developed religion is characterized by three essential doctrines: First, its doctrine of God; secondly, its doctrine of sin and salvation; thirdly, its doctrine of immortality.

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These, he said in effect, are the A B C of religion, and no religion worth while is possible without these doctrines. Yet a new school of religious thinkers is now arising who tell us that when religion comes of age these are the very doctrines which will be dispensed with. Theism is now challenged as it has not been since the eighteenth century.

It is, of course, regrettable that so much of our religious energy is spent in debating these A B C's or postulates of religion. Theology, or "first philosophy," as Aristotle called it, is meant to be an intellectual gateway to religion and should therefore be as simple and as common sense as possible. We have discovered that theology is not religion, as our forefathers often thought; and that the lingering in it is not productive of the highest religious life. We find that we need less of theology than we once thought. Still hardly any thinking person would deny that religion will stand or fall with its postulates, and that some sort of "first philosophy" of moral and religious experience will always be needed. Nor should we be too much disturbed over the demand for the revision of these postulates. We must remember that even the postulates of mathematics have of recent years undergone revision, and that mathematics has not yet fallen. Nevertheless, it is a matter of profound regret to some of us who regard religion primarily as a cultural tool for the redemption, the upbuilding, of our human world that so much of our time and



energy is spent on these A B C's of the religious life, when we should be going on and building a kingdom of God on earth. We wonder if we shall ever come out of the infantile stage of religious consciousness and develop a mature religious consciousness which takes these postulates for granted. The immediate future, it is becoming evident, will see an even greater discussion of these theological foundations of religious belief than the past has seen. Religion has not yet outgrown its theological stage, and it cannot until its necessary philosophical foundations are settled. Let us see, therefore, what attitude the mature religious consciousness of the future will probably take toward the postulates of religion.

Let us take, first, the doctrine of God, as that is the foundation of developed religion. A recent writer informs us, "Whether interpreted in crudely personal terms, or in the refined metaphysics of philosophic idealism, the concept of God, save as a symbol of human aspirations, has disappeared."<sup>4</sup> This must be somewhat startling news to Professors Hobhouse and Whitehead, if true. Another writer whom we have already quoted, while not quite confident that the concept has disappeared, announces confidently, "To-day the scientific view of life is fast rendering the idea of God superfluous."<sup>5</sup> Still another writer, while not renouncing the idea of God,

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<sup>4</sup>*World Unity*, February, 1929, Vol. III., p. 355.

<sup>5</sup>Wallace, "The Scientific World View," p. 4.

has apparently discovered that the infinite is God and seems greatly disturbed that physical science finds the infinite so big; therefore our ordinary human conceptions of God will not answer, and he calls for their radical revision.<sup>6</sup>

It must be said that most of these writers that belittle the theistic conception not only seem quite innocent of the work of such men as Hobhouse, who have carefully built up the theistic conception upon the results of modern science,<sup>7</sup> but they also seem to ignore the philosophical arguments for theism from Plato and Aristotle down to the present. There is no doubt, of course, that such a concept, like all other philosophical concepts, will have to be revised with the growth of knowledge. There is also little to be said for Comte's solution of this problem. Comte made the concepts of God and immortality entirely subjective, identifying God with the best in humanity and immortality with our continued influence upon the lives of others; but, as Professor Brightman says, our religious consciousness demands objectivity not less than our scientific consciousness. Religion looks not to the self-sufficiency of man, but to the sufficiency of God as an objective reality. A subjective religion would be, at least for

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<sup>6</sup>Barnes, "Does Science Require a New Conception of God?" in *Current History*, March, 1929, Vol. XXIX., pp. 883-896.

<sup>7</sup>See Hobhouse, "Development and Purpose."

the masses of mankind, a religion without motivating power.

Moreover, such a religion would be divorced absolutely from science; for if there is anything which science clearly teaches, it is that man is a part of nature, a part of a system immensely transcending himself, which has produced him and made possible all of his works. The religious consciousness no more than the scientific consciousness can stop with man. Man's reverence, affections, valuations naturally rise from himself to the ultimate reality which lies behind both him and physical nature. Hence religion demands a reality beyond man, to which the religious consciousness functions as a means of adjustment. Where science sees only the laws of physical necessity, however, religion sees a moral order, to which man must adjust himself, if he is to be in harmony with his universe.

Is this perception an illusion? So we are told by some who profess to speak in the name of science. We shall receive little help in seeking an answer to this question from the physical sciences. As one eminent physicist has said, the physical sciences are almost necessarily atheistic, because they find no clear evidence of a spiritual element in the reality which they investigate and hence no place for intelligence or moral purpose in their hypotheses. But we have already seen that it is wrong to identify science with physical science or its methods. The

sciences that deal with the life and behavior of man show very different facts. They show, for example, that all human culture is the work of the human mind and a direct outcome of intelligence. They show, too, that the culture that man has built controls his behavior, and so the development of his character. Finally they show that man, by taking thought, by invention, by the constructive use of his intelligence, is remaking this world and so remaking himself. In brief, if we mean by the spiritual the nonmaterial, the mental, and the social, then the human sciences show that the spiritual is increasingly dominating and transforming our human world.

But man and man's intelligence are a part of nature, of the universe, and not only a part, but the highest and most complex part; and we have every reason to believe that man reveals more completely the essential nature of the universe than do the stone, the chemical element, or even the lower forms of life. Man is a product of the universe, and we cannot believe that man is absolutely different from the universe without violating that principle of continuity upon which all science is based. If there is a spiritual element in man, it must have come from the universe, or from the power behind physical nature; and it must be greater in the universe than in man, since its development in man is still so incomplete. Man reveals, in other words, that there

is another pole to reality besides the physical energy with which physical science deals; and that that other pole is *mind*.

Now religion has always taught, in one form or other, the kinship of man with nature and of nature with man. No science or philosophy can long endure which denies this kinship. Religion is thus based upon the impregnable rock of common sense, and so also religion's fundamental concept of God. For God is simply religion's name for the universe under its spiritual aspect, the aspect that makes it akin with man's spiritual nature. As Professor Wieman puts it, "Not the cosmos in general, but the cosmos as consisting of possibilities for good, imagined or unimagined, is God."<sup>8</sup> This may be very different from the crude anthropomorphic theism, or rather deism, of our forefathers; but it represents modern religious thought, and it is safe to say that mankind as yet shows no tendencies to outgrow the theistic conception, either intellectually or emotionally. The fact is that mankind has not yet grown into it and that it will probably take centuries to do so.

Let us remember, then, that we believe in God if we believe in the universe as a spiritual fact. Only pure materialism is atheistic. The general recognition of these truths would save many misunderstandings and tragedies in the religious life. But,

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<sup>8</sup>*The Christian Century*, March 14, 1929, Vol. XLVI., p. 355.

it may be asked, does not science teach that we must give up the category of the spiritual? The answer is: "No; science is tested, generalized experience, and experience finds the spiritual aspect of reality equally real with the physical." It is only science which has illegitimately transformed itself into a materialistic metaphysics which denies the reality of the spiritual. Common sense has never done so. It may be granted that religion rests upon belief in the reality of the spiritual; it may also be granted that materialistic science has been increasing of recent years. But as in this case religion is on the side of common sense, while materialistic science is not, the issue of the conflict in the long run would not seem to be doubtful.

Practically all religions have believed in a god, or gods, or something equivalent. The real question which confronts the future, therefore, is, What sort of God shall we believe in? Probably our conception of God will have to be revised in the light of tested knowledge in some such way as has just been indicated. But the bigger question is, Can we still have belief in the God of Jesus? The more philosophical refinements of the God-concept are surely of small interest compared with the personal and social qualities which we attribute to him. Now, the center and core of Jesus's teachings regarding God is that God is our father. Other religious teachers had taught this before, to be sure, but in

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a more limited way. Jesus spiritualized and universalized God's fatherhood and made it the basis of his new religion of human brotherhood and of the love and service of mankind. After all, we have not transcended this idea, and personally I do not see how we can. The scientific and philosophical argument for theism just given at bottom expresses no different idea. The religious genius and insight of Christ was never better shown than in his doctrine of God; men will eventually learn that at best they may equal it, but never surpass it.

Let us now take up, briefly, the doctrine of sin and salvation, which Comte acknowledged to be the second necessary element in a developed religion. At once we are met by the statement that science finds no place for the concept of sin and that it should be dropped from the vocabulary of modern religion. It may be acknowledged that in a rigid, mechanically determined universe there would be no place for anything which might properly be called sin. But experience knows of no such universe, nor does sound science. It is a figment of the imagination of materialistic science. In the real universe, especially in the human world, we frequently find lack of adaptation or of harmony with the conditions of life. This lack of adaptation is due, in mankind, to four main causes: First, animal impulses, which, while they once adapted man to the wild life in the woods, now threaten

higher civilization; second, wrong habits, due chiefly to wrong education or bad early environment; third, misjudgments, due to a faulty use of intelligence; fourth, the survival in higher civilization of the customs and institutions of a lower civilization, such as slavery and war. All of these causes combined frequently make the physically normal human being pitifully maladjusted and far from realizing the possibilities of life. It is evident that the average human being is very imperfect. Now, sin is just this sense on the part of man of imperfection, so far as he feels himself responsible for it. It is the sense of sin, therefore, which leads him to strive in his moral life toward perfection. In other words, the conviction of sin—which need only be rational and not necessarily morbid—is necessary for spiritual development. Our conception of sin, of course, has changed, and we no longer count as sins ritualistic omissions or ceremonial uncleanness. In modern religion the sense of sin centers in the moral consciousness. Nevertheless, Professor Wieman is right when he declares: "The idea of sin gives to the evil in man a vaster significance than mere immorality, or opposition to social welfare, but it does so because of the enormous significance which it attaches to human conduct or to any human state of mind."<sup>9</sup> In other words, we have the sense of sin only when

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<sup>9</sup>*The Christian Century*, March 14, 1929, p. 356.

morality comes to us under its divine form—"under the aspect of eternity."

I cannot leave this topic without remarking that it is precisely the lack of a sense of sin which is the most discouraging thing in modern religious life. Our spiritual complacency threatens to be as deadly as our political and social complacency. We are corrupt, but contented in our corruption, as the French writer whom we quoted in the first lecture said in effect. We have no adequate sense of our moral imperfections, and hence no hope of improvement. This is the judgment not only of sound religion, but of sound science. And this is why we need a moral and religious awakening. But sin and complacency in sin are characteristic of communities as well as of individuals. Until this moral awakening comes to communities, the outlook for a better human world is dark and the way of life will remain unnecessarily difficult for individuals. We can find no justification in the facts of life for believing that a sinful or criminal environment fosters the development of saints.

Even more briefly must we deal with the third postulate of our religious life, the doctrine of immortality. At once we are told by the critics that this is a wishful conclusion which modern science compels us to give up. It is difficult to understand how there is anything in the spirit or the results of science, understood as tested knowledge, which com-

pels such a negative attitude. It would be strange if science, which has found continuity everywhere in nature and which has demonstrated the immortality of so many things, should at once settle down to the conviction that human personality perishes with death. That would, indeed, be a quite unwarranted conclusion, even though the problem is beyond the scope of science. Our universe, we know, is a conserving system and ~~if it is also a spiritual fact, the process of development cannot be~~ meaningless. Belief in God accordingly necessitates belief in some sort of immortality.

Perhaps it is well that we do not know just the form of our immortality. We know, indeed, that the good live on in lives made better by their good deeds; that is a fact of common observation and of the moral history of mankind. But beyond this relative immortality there is rational ground for faith in the immortality of the soul with God. The universe is a conserving system, and this must be true not only as regards its physical energy, but also as regards its spiritual life. Otherwise, we should have a dead and not a living universe, a mere machine and not an organism. Existence has many forms. Religion has almost from the beginning held that death is the gateway to a larger life. Further than this our faith probably does not need to go; for we know that otherworldliness has its temptations not less than this world. The supreme religious

insight of Christ showed itself indeed when he told his disciples, not that they might communicate with the spirits of the dead, as his world very generally believed, but simply that in his Father's house there are many rooms, and that if it were not so he would have told them. Here then is a rational form of the faith in immortality not inconsistent with modern knowledge and not impossible for even the most critically minded.

But these postulates, or A B C's, of the religious life are not Christianity, even though each of them received in Christ's hands a distinctively Christian form. Practically all developed religions, as we have seen, have had some doctrine of God, of sin, and of immortality. If the future religion of mankind bases itself upon experience, will these doctrines disappear or take a purely subjective form? We have no reason to think so. These postulates of religion are a part of religious experience, and not a mere matter of tradition. It is noteworthy that nearly all the more mature religious minds of history have felt this. Jesus, for example, had no halting, or minimum, belief in God, in sin and salvation, and immortality. On the contrary, these seemed to be nearly ever-present realities to him; and that is one reason we have for believing in the maturity of his religious consciousness. If we come down the ages we find the same was true of St. Francis, of Luther, of John Wesley, and of nearly all the greater reli-

gious leaders. In our own day Walter Rauschenbusch was a splendid example of this maximum faith. Will the masses of mankind ever attain to this maturity of religious consciousness and, with certainty of God, of salvation, and of immortality, go on to the real tasks of religion in the upbuilding of a kingdom of God in this world? Or will our Churches continue to occupy a large part of their time in trying to inspire faith in their members in these A B C's of religion? The answer is that it altogether depends upon our culture. There is much in our present culture to encourage agnosticism and materialism, and as long as this is so the Churches will have to spend a large part of their time in teaching their members the A B C's of religious life. But if religion is to be an aggressive mastery of the conditions of life, it must rise above these foundations to its real work of building a world of truth, beauty, and goodness. No doubt our age needs a renewed faith in these foundations of the religious life, and it can have it by entering upon the work of rebuilding our human world in conformity with justice and truth. Sometime in the future our human world will see that this long debate about fundamental religious concepts belongs to the infantile stage of religious consciousness, and that it would not be even bothering us now if our religious culture were not backward in its development.

What, then, is the real task of developed religion?



It can be nothing less than the redemption of our human world, if religion is the creator and preserver of our highest values. Redemptive religion began to develop in our culture a little over two thousand years ago. Gautama Buddha envisaged the problem as purely individual. It was reserved for Jesus, with the rich background of Jewish religious consciousness, to see that the problem was both individual and social, that individual character and the social order should both express the divine ideal. The great problem of the future development of religion upon this planet, therefore, is what shall be done with Jesus and his teachings? This is the question which will not down in religion, and compared to it all other discussion of religious problems is puerile.

Let us see why the place of Jesus and his teaching is the commanding problem of the religion of the future. It is because Jesus made the center and core of his teachings the radical concept of a kingdom of God upon earth and so in effect presented a demand for a new world. Says Dr. E. Stanley Jones: "The kingdom of God is the most astoundingly radical proposal ever presented to the human race. It means nothing less than the replacing of the present world order by the kingdom of God."<sup>10</sup> And he adds that the ethnic religions have in general had no program corresponding to the kingdom of God, that

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<sup>10</sup>"Christ at the Round Table," p. 90.

in general they thought of redemption as merely individual release, not as the building of a new world upon new principles, but as an escape from this one. It must be confessed that historical Christianity has often had the same character. That is one reason why the religion of the future cannot be based upon historical Christianity, but must, in order to avoid misunderstanding, go back to the teachings of Christ, as recorded in the Gospels. "It is a reproach to us," says Dean Inge, "that the teaching of Christ must be regarded as only one of many elements which make up what we call Christianity."

But why should the religion of the future go back to Christ and turn from the historical Church? Has not the Church been the greatest force for Christianity even in the sense of the teachings of Jesus? That cannot be denied. Whatever Christianity there is in the world is due to the historical Christian Church. But that is no argument why we should not go back to the original fountain of the Christian movement, the life and teachings of Christ, to start afresh to follow him. Any Church that is truly Christian will surely desire to do so. The truth is that the Church is so divided, and in so many instances has failed to grasp the spirit and content of Christ's teachings, that we do not know what Church to turn to, but are compelled to appeal from the Churches to Christ himself.

As a cultural phenomenon, this is probably fortunate, because it presents the best hope of freeing the Christian movement from the dross which has attached itself to it during the course of centuries. But should we turn back to the Christ of the Gospels? Why not, the radical religionist may ask, invent a new religion? The reply is that we cannot get away from Christ in religion any more than we can get away from Copernicus in astronomy and still stay sound and sane. We may elaborate the Copernican theory and advance far beyond Copernicus, but we build upon his system. So in religion we may elaborate what Christ taught, and perhaps advance beyond him, but we must build upon him if we wish our religious structure to be sound.

Let us see why this is so. The clear teaching of Christ was that the only possible way to serve God was through the service of men. We cannot get away from this principle, no matter how far we advance in our ethical and religious development. For it socializes both religion and ethics and places both in the service of the progress of mankind. Here, then, we have created for us a religion of humanity without destroying the faith in God which is the necessary foundation of all developed religion. The distinctive virtue of such a religion is necessarily love, the inclusive love of all mankind; not a sentimental love, but a genuine love which expresses itself in a life of service and sacrifice. The highest

value, in other words, of intimate personal social life was made by Jesus the highest value of religion. The family pattern was made to typify the relations of God and all mankind. Thus religion undertook to carry over from the family and other intimate social groups the patterns of kindness, sympathy, mutual appreciation, affection, and service of those groups at their best to humanity at large; in short, to universalize these patterns in the behavior of all mankind. It is clear that Jesus, intertwining both religion and ethics in one common system, socialized both in a way that we cannot hope to surpass. This is the more true because the Jesus of the Gospels is the most perfectly socialized personality which we know in history, well fitted, as even unfriendly critics have been compelled to admit, to remain for all time "an ideal to foster and strengthen the noblest tendencies," the eternal leader of humanity toward the realization of its ideals both of personal character and of social life.

The social character of Christ's religion is, however, best revealed by its program. It looked to the establishment of a social order in which God's will should be done—a kingdom of God, as we have said, which should make of humanity one large family with genuine love and good will among all its members. But this new social order was not to be established by force or authority, but by a new life within the individual soul—a life redeemed from sin and

brought into harmony with the divine will. Jesus saw clearly that before the kingdom of God could be realized men must give up their cynical indifference and unbelief and become reconciled to God and to one another. Jesus, in short, marked out a new way of life for men and for all humanity—the way of genuine love.

But while the religion of Jesus cannot be surpassed from the point of view of socialization, some say that that is just the reason it cannot be the religion of the future. It is too idealistic. Its emphasis upon unselfish love is too extreme. While it may not be true that man is a mere animal doing always as he desires, subject only to the limitations of his power, a society dominated by enlightened altruism, or the intelligent love of humanity, these critics say, is improbable if not impossible. I have elsewhere attempted to show that such cynical realism is not well grounded. Yet no one can easily deny that the present trend both in Europe and in America is to accept some such conclusion. Both Europe and America would apparently “step down” the Christianity of Christ and make it simply an ameliorative influence in a world which is accepted as necessarily evil. It is still not easy for the world to believe, any more than in Christ’s day, that genuine love presents a way of life for both individuals and groups. Men still find the greatest difficulty in accepting this central core of Christ’s teachings. Speaking of

the difficulty, and comparing the way of love to a tiny gate, Professor Wieman rightly says: "When one looks out upon the human race, the way it has come and the way it must go, and sees that tiny gate so obscure that one must search to find it, and so lowly that one must stoop to enter it, and yet the only way to life, the only escape from ruin for mankind, one is sobered. One cannot hope that there will be continuous days of easy power and prosperity, for in such times men miss the way of love, and this automatically brings on destruction and the end of such comfortable periods. Civilizations will be transitory until men in large numbers go this way of love."<sup>11</sup>

It must be admitted that our civilization may easily fail to find the narrow gate and may prove to be transitory. But if it does, some other civilization will find it; and it is scarcely probable that the essence of Christianity, as we have just stated, will pass away. Some time, somewhere, men are bound to discover that the spiritual and social life of mankind is subject to law not less than the physical world. If we blunderingly persist in building our civilization upon the self-interest of the individual, or even upon the selfish interests of classes or national groups, then we may be sure that it is built upon the sand and that some other civilization than ours will profit by our mistake.

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<sup>11</sup> "Religious Experience and Scientific Method," p. 116.



If we do not want some such calamity as this to befall us, then our churches must speedily transform themselves into educational institutions to educate the young and also adults into Christ's way of life. Theological doctrines and even the Old Testament must be strictly subordinated to the teaching of Christian ideals, or the way of genuine love, in every phase of life. This means not only teaching Christ, but fearlessly applying his ethics to every problem that perplexes men in their individual or group relations. It means that the chief work of the Church is to create a Christian conscience in both adults and the young regarding the problems of human life. Our whole culture must be brought under critical scrutiny in order to discriminate in it the pagan from the Christian elements. This must especially be done in the religious education of the young; for the young are not equipped to discriminate the pagan from the Christian elements in our civilization; and in that way the hold of Christian ideals upon them is weakened. The Church must particularly devote itself to the education of the nobler emotions, the development of pity, sympathy, and love, not limited by the barriers of class, nation, or race, but as wide as humanity itself. But above all, it must present Christ himself as the ideal and as the savior of mankind. There is a place in the Church, therefore, for legitimate evangelism; for the Church, like all other human institutions, must

be constantly awakened to its duties. Evangelism of the saner and more intelligent sort, indeed, must be considered a phase of adult education, undertaken by the Church largely because the education of the young into Christian ideals was inadequate, partly because they were outside of the Church, partly because the Church itself failed. Such evangelism requires, besides an adequate understanding of human psychology, an intelligent comprehension of the teachings of Christ, on the one hand, and of human needs, on the other. It is essentially the work of the pulpit as distinguished from the work of the Church school. Both should work together to educate all into Christ's way of life. Thus the Church might become an efficient instrument for the establishment of the kingdom of God.

Now, if we can have such a Church constructively dominant in our society, I see no reason why our civilization should perish. Our civilization is imperiled to-day simply because it is ill-balanced. Our spiritual culture lags so far behind our material culture in its development that we have no adequate control over the latter. Our science, our education, and our government can do much to help correct this lag in our spiritual development. But in the main this must be done, if done at all, by religion and by the Church. For religion is the creator and the conservator of our social ideals; and the Church is their chief propagator. The Church in this sense

is the spiritual power in our society, while the Christian Church is the only institution that is specifically devoted to the realization of Christian ideals. In so far as the Church is inefficient the whole spiritual life of human society must suffer and the destiny of civilization be imperiled. Science, intellectual education, and government are not enough, for the simple reason that human society requires something more for its welfare than intelligence and coercive authority; that something more is genuine, active good will among its individuals and groups. A socialized religion will therefore make the promotion of such good will its main object. In other words, it will devote itself to the furtherance of Christ's principle of universal love. In this sense all socialized religion must be Christian—if not in name, at least in fact.

Gradually this perception must grow within the Christian Church if that institution is not to decay. Rather than a few individuals the world will be made the subject of redemption. The building of a Christian civilization will be, equally with the saving of individual souls, the concern of the Church. Indeed, it will be seen that these are but two sides of the same process. Unless customs, institutions, and social conditions are made Christian, we cannot expect that they will produce Christlike characters in men and women, nor stable and harmonious relations between groups. An in-

telligent Church will more and more perceive this. More and more it will perceive that it cannot limit the work of redemption. The Christian Church of the future will, therefore, ask its members not to believe in "Christianity Limited," but in "Christianity Unlimited." Such an intelligent Church will understand that a civilization half-Christian and half-pagan is in an unstable condition and cannot endure; that just as Greco-Roman civilization went down because the masses were left brutal, ignorant, and impoverished, so our civilization is unsafe with the masses even of Christian lands sunk in ignorance, poverty, vice, and crime. Such an intelligent Church will perceive that its task is not only to lead civilization, but to lead the vanguard of human progress. It will turn freely to scientific knowledge, to education, and to government for means of eliminating errors and correcting evils. But it will do something which none of these can do—it will enthuse men not only for the redemption of individuals, but for the redemption of communities and of mankind. It will pledge its members to dedicate their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to the redemption of humanity from sin and ignorance. It will be an army for human salvation, working, however, not with the blare of trumpets, but quietly with adequate knowledge, with unfaltering faith in God, and with unlimited love toward men. It will recognize no religion as worth while

unless it is redemptive; but it will coöperate with all men of good will in the work of redeeming men everywhere from ignorance, impoverishment, hate, irrational fear, foolish pride, brutal lusts, vice, crime, and self-will, whether those who so work work under the banner of the Church or in some other way.

Such a Church may never arrive. But if not, the cause of Christ will perish from the earth, and with it the civilization which has fostered us. Personally, I believe that it is even now arriving. The light of truth is breaking everywhere in our world; and this light cannot fail to reveal to men, sooner or later, the divine ideal by which they should live.









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